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Abstract
When intellectual properties are distributed over a broadcast network, the content
is usually encrypted in a way such that only authorized users who have a certain set
of keys, can decrypt the content. Some authorized users may be willing to disclose
their keys in constructing a pirate decoder which allows illegitimate users to access
the content. It is desirable to determine the source of the keys in a pirate decoder,
once one is captured. Traitor tracing schemes were introduced to help solve this
problem. A traitor tracing scheme usually consists of: a scheme to generate and
distribute each user's personal key, a cryptosystem used to protect session keys
that are used to encrypt/decrypt the actual content, and a tracing algorithm to
determine one source of the keys in a pirate decoder. In this thesis, we survey
the traitor tracing schemes that have been suggested. We group the schemes into
two groups: symmetric in which the session key is encrypted and decrypted using
the same key and asymmetric schemes in which the session key is encrypted and
decrypted using dierent keys. We also explore the possibility of a truly public
scheme in which the data supplier knows the encryption keys only. A uniform
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Consider an application which provides data that should be available to authorized
users only. The number of authorized users is big enough so that broadcasting the
data is much more eÆcient than establishing a secure channel between the data
provider and each authorized user. The data could obviously be protected from
unauthorized access by encryption. And the data supplier could provide the de-
cryption keys to the authorized users only, and broadcast the encrypted ciphertext.
However this does not prevent one or more authorized users from retransmitting the
plaintext they have obtained by decrypting the received ciphertext, or simply dis-
closing their personal keys to some unauthorized users. In this event, unauthorized
users have access to data that they are not entitled to.
We call this unauthorized access piracy. The traitors are the groups of autho-
rized users who allow unauthorized users to obtain the data, either by retransmit-
ting the plaintext, or disclosing their personal decryption keys. The unauthorized
users who obtained the data are called pirate users.
Traitor tracing schemes or traceability schemes are cryptographic techniques
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preventing traitors from distributing their personal keys to enable pirates decrypt-
ing the data. In such a scheme, each authorized user is given a decoder which
contains the user's personal decryption key. A symmetric encryption algorithm
(such as DES, AES) is used to encrypt the data using a randomly generated ses-
sion key. The data distributer encrypts the session key in a way such that only an
authorized user's decoder is able to decrypt the session key and hence recover the
data. Suppose a group of traitors contribute their personal keys to build a pirate
decoder which can also decrypt the ciphertext. The scheme should discover the
keys in the pirate decoder and determine one or more traitors who have helped
build the pirate decoder by contributing their personal keys. The following is a
scheme which can trace the traitor if there is only one traitor.
Example 1.0.1 There are n users:fu1; u2;    ; ung, and 2 log n keys:
 = fk1;0; k1;1; k2;0; k2;1;    ; klogn;0; klogn;1g:
We assume n is a power of 2. The personal key for user ui is the set of m = log n
keys:
fk1;bi;1; k2;bi;2 ;    ; klogn;bi;log ng;
where bi;j is the j-th bit in the binary representation of i. Suppose we use DES
to encrypt the content M using session key s. Let Bm = DESs(M) denote the
ciphertext. We choose s1; s2;    ; slogn, such that Llogni=1 si = s. Then si is encrypted






where k denotes concatenation. Both of Bm and Be are broadcasted. Notice that
each user ui has keys kj;bi;j , 1  j  log n. ui can decrypt all sj's and hence obtain
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s. Suppose a user uc reveals his personal key:
fk1;bc;1 ; k2;bc;2;    ; klogn;bc;log ng:
Since each user's personal key is unique, we can easily nd the identity of the user
from the disclosed key.
Traitor tracing schemes do not address treachery where the traitors retransmit
the plaintext they obtained. This is in contrast to normal ngerprinting schemes,
which address the situation where traitors redistribute the pictures, text, or pro-
grams they obtain. This is achieved by embedding an unique ngerprint to each
copy of data distributed, so that the data distributor can identify the original re-
ceiver of a redistributed copy. In principle in traitor tracing schemes, the keys used
to decrypt the encrypted the session key are ngerprinted instead of the data itself.
Fingerprinting schemes are not suitable to broadcasting, since the copy received by
each user must dier from the copies received by others. In traitor tracing schemes,
only one copy of the content is broadcasted.
In some applications, it might be valid to assume that redistributing the plain-
text is too costly. A typical application would be pay-TV, where it is obviously too
expensive and too risky to operate a pirate broadcast system. We are also going
to assume that the session key is changed frequently such that broadcasting the
session key is also infeasible and risky.
One trivial solution is to encrypt the data separately under dierent personal
keys and broadcast all ciphertexts encrypted under every key. This means that the
amount of the data broadcasted is at least n times the amount of the original data,
where n is number of authorized users. Such a solution is clearly not very eÆcient.
The intent of this thesis is to survey the traitor tracing schemes have been
suggested and perform a uniform analysis of the eÆciency of these schemes. We are
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going to measure the eÆciency of each scheme in terms of the following performance
parameters:
1. storage and computational requirements at the data distributor/broadcastor
side,
2. storage and computational requirements at the user side,
3. bandwidth requirement,
4. computational requirements by the tracing algorithm, i.e., given a pirate de-
coder, the computational cost to determine one or more traitors.
We begin in Chapter 2 with a list of denitions. In Chapter 3 we describe
symmetric schemes in which the session key is encrypted using a symmetric key
system. We present asymmetric schemes in which the session key is encrypted and
decrypted using dierent keys but the data supplier knows both keys in Chapter 4;
and investigate the possibility of constructing truely public key schemes in which the
data supplier knows only the encrytion key but not the decryption key in Chapter




Traitor tracing scheme was rst introduced by Chor, Fiat and Naor [6] in 1994.
Since then, other traitor tracing schemes were suggested by B. Ptzmann in [13],
Stinson and Wei in [15], Dwork, Lotspiech, and Naor in [7], Anderson and Mani-
favas in [2], Kurosawa and Desmedt in [10], Boneh and Franklin in [3], Fiat and
Tassa in [8]. A typical traitor tracing scheme consists of three components:
1. key generation/distribution scheme: used by the data supplier to generate
and distribute users' personal keys. The data supplier has a master-key 
that denes a mapping P : U 7! K, where U is the set of possible users and
K is the set of all possible personal keys. In Example 1.0.1,
P(ui) = fk1;bi;1 ; k2;bi;2 ;    ; klogn;bi;log ng;
where bi;j is the j-th bit in the binary representation of i.
2. encryption/decryption scheme: an encryption scheme E is used by the data
supplier to encrypt the session key before broadcasting, and a decryption
5
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scheme D is used by each authorized user (i.e. its decoder) to decrypt
the session key, where  = P(ui). Obviously, for any session key s, s =
D(E(s)). And the session key is used to encrypt data content using a
o-the-shelf symmetric encryption scheme such as DES.
3. tracing algorithm: used upon conscation of a pirate decoder, to determine
the identity of one or more traitors. We are not going to assume the content
of a pirate decoder can always be viewed by the tracing algorithm. We prefer
that the tracing algorithm is only able to access any pirate decoder as a black
box and perform the tracing based on the decoder's respond on dierent input
ciphertexts.
We usually require the o-the-shelf encryption scheme E to be a block cipher.
The data supplier divides the content into sessions whose size is a multiple of a
block size accepted by E. For each content session M , a typical traitor tracing
scheme will output two blocks. A ciphertext block Bc is the result of encrypting
M by the encryption scheme E using some key s randomly chosen from the key
space of E: Bc = Es(M). We call s the session key. A second block is called an
enabling block, because it contains data that enables each authorized user to obtain
the session key s, and hence decrypt the corresponding ciphertext block (see Figure






An obvious and preliminary requirement from traitor tracing schemes is that the
underlying encryption scheme used to encrypt session keys must be computationally
secure. That is, an adversary which has no information on any personal keys should
not be able to decrypt the session key. (It is assumed that the o-the-shelf is






Decrypt Session Key s
Decrypt Ciphertext Block
Figure 2.1: The Decryption of a Ciphertext Block
computationally secure.) Therefore, if there is a pirate decoder which decrypts the
ciphertext with non-negligible probability, it must contain certain information on
some personal keys. It is assumed that these personal keys belong to the traitors
who helped construct the pirate decoder. The tracing algorithm should be able to
determine at least one of the traitors.
Suppose that a coalition of k users collude to create a pirate decoder. We would
like to determine at least one member of the coalition. Intuitively, a traitor tracing
scheme is fully resilient if it can identify (with high certainty) at least one member
of the coalition, given that the underlying encryption scheme is not broken.
Denition 2.0.1 Suppose the underlying encryption scheme is computationally se-
cure. A scheme is fully (p; k)-resilient if for every pirate decoder constructed by a
coalition of at most k traitors and decrypts ciphertext correctly with a probability
greater than the probability of breaking the underlying encryption scheme, the trac-
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ing algorithm can trace at least one traitor of the coalition with probability at least
1   p. If the scheme further achieves p = 0, it is called a fully k-resilient.
Example 1.0.1 is a fully 1-resilient traitor tracing scheme.
There are many applications for which the pirate decoder must decrypt with
probability close to 1. For example, if a TV broadcast is partitioned intom segments
and these m segments are encrypted independently, then a decoder which decrypts
only 90 percent of the segments is probably not very useful or attractive. In this
circumstance, we can concentrate on tracing the pirate decoders that can decrypt
with probability greater than a certain threshold.
Denition 2.0.2 Suppose the underlying encryption scheme is computationally se-
cure. A scheme is called q-threshold (p,k)-resilient scheme if for every pirate decoder
constructed by a coalition of at most k traitors and decrypts ciphertext correctly with
a probability greater than q, the tracing algorithm can trace at least one member of
the coalition with probability at least 1  p.
We can further distinguish between two types of schemes:
Denition 2.0.3 A scheme is called an open scheme if it treats circumstances
where the key generation/distribution scheme and decryption schemes used by all
users are in the public domain, whereas the master key is the only information that
is kept secret.
Denition 2.0.4 A scheme is called a secret scheme if the actual key genera-
tion/distribution scheme as well as the keys are kept secret.
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Clearly, the adversary's task is harder with a secret scheme compared to an
open scheme. In general, secret schemes are more eÆcient than open schemes that
achieve the same level of security and traceability. However, we do not encourage
to base the security and traceability of a scheme on the premise that the adversary
does not know the key generation/distribution scheme. We would prefer a scheme
which achieves the desired security and traceability under Kerckho's principle,
that is the adversary knows the complete scheme except for the key.
Chapter 3
Symmetric Schemes
Chor, Fiat and Naor rst introduced traitor tracing schemes in [6]. With Pinkas
in 1998, they further suggested threshold traitor tracing schemes [5]. Six dierent
types of traitor tracing schemes were mentioned: one level open scheme, two level
open scheme, one level secret scheme, two level secret scheme, one level threshold
scheme, and two level threshold scheme. We call these schemes Chor-Fiat-Naor-
Pinkas (CFNP) schemes. Example 1.0.1 is a one level open CFNP scheme. The
existence of CFNP schemes were proved using probabilistic method. But the proofs
are not constructive. Stinson and Wei provided several constructions for a variant
of the one level open scheme in [14].
In this chapter we are going to present the six CFNP schemes, as well as the
SW schemes suggested by Stinson and Wei. All the schemes in this chapter are
symmetric in the sense that the session keys are encrypted and decrypted using
same set of keys.
10
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3.1 Overview
Throughout the rest of this thesis we are going to use the following notations. U
is the set of authorized users, and n =j U j. k is the upper bound on the number
of traitors. T is a set of traitors such that j T j k.
The master key  is actually a set of keys randomly chosen from the key space
of the o-the-shelf symmetric encryption scheme E. We call this set of keys base
keys. In Example 1.0.1,
 = fk1;0; k1;1; k2;0; k2;1;    ; klogn;0; klogn;1g:
A session key s is divided into several shares using secret sharing schemes, so that
to contruct s, a certain subset of shares must be obtained. The shares are encrypted
using E.
CFNP schemes employ a set of hash functions to assign each user u a subset
of the base keys . We call this subset of keys personal key of u, and denote it
P (u). The assignment must satisfy two properties. First, it must ensure each user
is able to decrypt enough shares to construct the session key s. In Example 1.0.1,
the key distribution must ensure a user has at least one key in Kj = fkj;0; kj;1g,
1  j  log n, so that the user can decrypt sj. Furthermore, the assignment
must guarantee that any set F of keys, taken from a set of users T , j T j k,
(F  P (T ) = [v2TP (v)), has the following property: if F enables the decryption
of session key s, then there does not exist an innocent user u 2 U n T , such
that j F \ P (u) jj F \ P (v) j, for all v 2 T . This property will enable us to
identify at least one member of T , as there exists at least one v 2 T , such that
j F \ P (v) jj F \ P (u) j, for all u 2 U . Then v is called an exposed user.
Assume E is compuationally secure. To decrypt the cipher block, an adversary
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must know the session key s. In order to construct s, an adversary has to obtain a
subset of secret shares that satisfes a certain property. Since each share is encrypted
by E and E is computationally secure, we can assume that the adversary must
possess a subset of base keys with a certain property. This property plays an
important role in tracing the identity of the owners of the keys the adversary has.
In Example 1.0.1, the adversary has to obtain all the shares s1; s2;    ; slogn. He
must have at least one key from each of Ki; 1  i  log n, since each share si is
encrypted by E using keys in Ki.
In the rest of this section, we are going to prove an important result which is
used frequently in the following sections where we present the six CFNP schemes.
First we state a standard theorem from [1] (Theorem A.12, page 237).
Theorem 3.1.1 (Cherno Bound:) Assume:
p1; p2;    ; pn 2 [0; 1];
p =
p1 + p2 +   + pn
n
;
X1;X2;    ;Xn independent random variables with
Pr[Xi = 1  pi] = pi
Pr[Xi =  pi] = 1   pi
X = X1 +X2 +   +Xn
Then, for all   1, we have
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We are going to prove the following corollary of the Cherno Bound.
Corollary 3.1.2 With the same assumptions as in the above theorem except,
Pr[Xi = 1] = pi
Pr[Xi = 0] = 1  pi
Then, for all   1, we have




Proof: Dene random variables, Y1; Y2;    ; Yn,
Yi = Xi   pi; 1  i  n;
Then,
Pr[Yi = 1   pi] = Pr[Xi = 1] = pi
Pr[Yi =  pi] = Pr[Xi = 0] = 1  pi
So, by Cherno Bound we have,




But, X = Y +
P
n
i=1 pi = Y + pn. Therefore,
Pr[X  pn] = Pr[Y + pn  pn]
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3.2 One Level Open Scheme
Key distribution: The master key  in the one level open scheme introduced
here contains 2k2l base keys randomly chosen from the key space of the under-
lying encryption scheme E, where l is a parameter we will explain later. The
keys are partitioned into l buckets, such that each bucket contains 2k2 keys. Let
B1; B2;    ; Bl denote the buckets and let ki;j; 1  i  l; 1  j  2k2 denote the jth
key in Bi. In Example 1.0.1, there are log n buckets and each bucket has two keys:
Bi = fki;0; ki;1g.
The scheme employs l hash functions h1; h2;    ; hl. Each hash function
hi : U = f1; 2;    ; ng ! f1; 2;    ; 2k2g; 1  i  l
assigns one key from bucket Bi to each user. Thus, a user u 2 U gets personal key:
P (u) = fk1;h1(u); k2;h2(u);    ; kl;hl(u)g:
Encryption: For each plaintext session M , a key s is randomly chosen in the
key space of E. s is divided into l shares, s1; s2;    ; sl, such that s =Lli=1 sl. Then
si is encrypted using E with all keys in bucket i, 1  i  l. The concatenation
of all these encrypted shares form the enabling block. So, Be = kli=1(k2k
2
j=1Eki;j (si)).
The cipher block is simply Bc = Es(M).
Since any authorized user u 2 U has one key in each bucket, u can decrypt all
of s1; s2; : : : ; sl, and hence reconstruct s and decrypt the plaintext M . And if an
adversary wants to obtain s, he must know the values of all secret shares. Thus we
can assume that if a decoder D can decrypt M with a non-negligible probability,
then D must possess at least one key from each bucket.
Tracing: We assume the pirate decoder has at least one key from each bucket.
Upon conscation of a pirate decoder, we would like to expose at least one key from












































Figure 3.1: The Encryption and Decryption of a Session Key in a One Level CFNP
Open Scheme
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each bucket by experimenting with the decoder without taking the decoder apart,
i.e., treating the decoder as a blackbox.
Figure 3.2 gives the tracing algorithm presented in [5] which identies one of
the traitors who helped build the pirate decoder by contributing their personal key.
The algorithm takes a pirate decoder D as input and outputs one of the traitors.
Lines 1 to 7 determine a subset F 0 of the keys in D, such that F 0 has exactly one
key in each bucket. Lines 8 to 11 identify one user u who has the maximumnumber
of personal keys in common with F 0, i.e., j F 0 \P (u) jj F 0 \ P (v) j, for all v 2 U .
Notice that experimentEi;j has the same eect as removing keys ki;1; ki;2;    ; ki;j
from Ki, where Ki is the set of keys used to encrypt si. Suppose D uses key ki;ci in
bucket i to recover the share si. Then D would fail Ei;ci since key ki;ci is no longer
valid in Ei;ci . But D would successfully decode Ei;ci 1 .
Now what if D has more than one key in a bucket? Let Fi denote the keys
D has in bucket i, j Fi j 2. For each session, D randomly chooses one key from
Fi to recover share si. The algorithm would fail if we performed each experiment
Ei;j once. For example, suppose Fi = fki;1; ki;3g. D uses ki;3 in Ei;1, so it decrypts
successfully. But, D also uses ki;1 in Ei;2. Since key ki;1 is not longer valid in Ei;2,
D will fail, and the algorithm would mistakenly conclude D has key ki;2. What
[5] suggested is to repeat Ei;j a suÆcient number of times and take the fraction
of times D decrypts successfully. Suppose Fi = fki;a1 ; ki;a2;    ; ki;ak0g ,where 1 
a1 < a2 <    < ak0  2k2; k0  k. Suppose the probability that key ki;aj is chosen




Pr(j). Let fi;j be the fraction of times D decrypts
correctly on experiment Ei;j. Then fi;j = fi;j 1 if ki;j 62 Fi and fi;j < fi;j 1 if
ki;j 2 Fi.
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Input: pirate decoder D
Output: one traitor
1. Let Ei;j be the experiment: prepare a normal encryption session, but choose
j random keys to replace ki;1; ki;2;    ; ki;j.
2. for 1  i  l do
3. for 0  j  2k2 do
4. repeat experiment Ei;j r times,
5. let fi;j be the fraction of times D decrypts correctly on experiment
Ei;j .
6. if fi;j   fi;ci 1 > fi;0=2k2
7. ci = j, i++, goto 3
8. for each u 2 U do
9. for 1  i  l do
10. crtu ++ if hi(u) = ci
11. return u such that crtu = MAXu2Ucrtu
Figure 3.2: Tracing Algorithm for One Level Open Scheme
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However, if D has more than one key in a bucket, it can detect if it is being
inquired by a tracing algorithm, by using all keys in Fi to decrypt share si. In
an ordinary decoding operation, all values obtained should be the same. But in
the tracing algorithm, if some of Fi are removed with respect to experiment Ei;j,
the values of si obtained by using dierent keys would dier. If this happens, D
knows it is being inquired by the tracing algorithm, and can intentionally decrypt
incorrectly to fool the algorithm. Thus the suggested algorithm does not work well
if D has more than one key in a bucket.
Here, we assume D has exactly one key in each bucket and the tracing algorithm
detects the set of keys F 0 = fk1;c1 ; k2;c2;    ; kl;clg in D. We are going to mark a
user u 2 U once for each of his personal keys in F 0 (line 10). Let crtu denote the
number of times u gets marked. Then crtu =j F 0 \ P (u) j. We claim that the user
u with the largest value crtu is a traitor. Notice that there are at most k traitors,
and there are l keys in F 0. Thus there is one traitor t 2 T such that crtt  l=k.
Clearly a user u will not be declared as a traitor unless crtu  l=k.
Notice the algorithm always declares one user to be a traitor. We are going
to show that there exists a choice of h1; h2;    ; hl such that the tracing algorithm
won't mistakenly identify an innocent user as a traitor. We say a coalition T can
frame an innocent user u (i.e., u 62 T ) if T can build a pirate decoder D such that
the tracing algorithm with D as the input will claim u as a traitor.
Lemma 3.2.1 There exists a choice of h1; h2;    ; hl, such that no coalition of k
traitors can frame an innocent user not in the coalition.
Proof: Let h1; h2;    ; hl be randomly chosen. We show that the probability that
there exists a coalition of k traitors, and a user u 2 U n T , such that T can frame
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u is less than 1. And hence, there must exist a choice of h1; h2;    ; hl such that no
coalition of k traitors can frame any innocent user.
Consider a specic user u, and a specic coalition T  U of k traitors, u 62 T .
Suppose T builds a pirate decoder D such that D can decrypt with a non-negligible
probability. D is inputted to the tracing algorithm. Let Au;T denote the event




denote the event that at the termination of the tracing algorithm, we have
crtu  l=k. Clearly, Pr(Au;T )  Pr(A0u;T ), since there exists a traitor t with
crtt  l=k.
As the hash functions are chosen at random, the values hi(u) are uniformly
distributed in f1; 2;    ; 2k2g, and so the key ki;hi(u) is uniformly distributed in
bucket Bi. Let F = [t2TP (t), i.e., F is the set of personal keys belonging to the
traitors in T. Let Fi = F\Bi, i.e., Fi is the set of personal keys in bucket i belong to





, since there are 2k2 keys in Bi. Note that, since this is a open scheme,
the traitors might know which key in Bi is assigned to u. Also they can build a
decoder that the key ki;hi(u) is exposed by the tracing algorithm, if ki;hi(u) 2 Fi, so
that u would get more marks.




1 if there exists t 2 T such that hi(t) = hi(u)
0 otherwise:
(3.1)







i=1Xi)  l2k . Notice that
P
l
i=1Xi is not smaller than the number of marks
user u gets, since F 0  F .
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Now, apply Corollary 3.1.2, substituting p = 1
2k










































The probability that T is able to frame u is Pr(Au;T )  Pr(A0u;T ) < 2 
l
4k . There





CA possible choise of a coalition of size k and an innocent user.
















CA  2  l4k :
We would like to choose a value for l, so that the above probability is less than 1.
Suppose we take l  4k(k + 1) log n. Then we have











CA  2 (k+1) logn
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 n  nk  (2logn) (k+1)
= nk+1  n (k+1)
= 1:
Therefore there exists a choice of l hash functions h1; h2;    ; hl, such that for
any pirate decoder built by any coalition T of size k, no innocent user will be
incriminated by the tracing algorithm. 2
By using the hash functions h1; h2;    ; hl with the above property, we have a
fully k-resilient traitor tracing scheme.
Theorem 3.2.2 There is an open fully k-resilient scheme, where the data supplier's
master key consists of 8k3(k+1) log n base keys, and a user's personal key consists
of 4k(k + 1) log n keys. 2
Notice that the proof of Lemma 3.2.1 is not constructive. Thus Theorem 3.2.2
shows only the existence of a open fully k-resilient traceability schemes. Although it
does provide us with a randomized method for constructing the scheme that works
with high probability, it does not suggest an explicit construction for a deterministic
scheme. However, the desired property of a given construction can be veried
eÆciently. The idea is to examine all pairs of distinct users u,v, and check the
number of hash functions hi; 1  i  l in the given construction such that hi(u) =
hi(v).
Theorem 3.2.3 Given hash functions hi : f1; 2;    ; ng 7! f1; 2;    ; dg; 1  i  l,
if for every pair of distinct users u, v, the number of hi's such that hi(u) = hi(v) is
less than l=k
2
, i.e., j hi; 1  i  l : hi(u) = hi(v) j< l=k2, then we have a k-resilient
traceability scheme, with n users, ld base keys, where each user has l keys.
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Proof: Let T be a coalition of at most k traitors. Recall that there exists a traitor
t 2 T such that t gets marked at least dl=ke times by the tracing algorithm. We
only have to show that there is no innocent user u 2 U nT such that u gets marked
at least dl=ke times.
Notice, for any t 2 T , j hi; 1  i  l : hi(u) = hi(t) j< l=k2 Then the number
of hi's such that there exists a t 2 T such that hi(u) = hi(t) is less than l=k2  k =
l=k  dl=ke. Thus, no innocent user will ever be marked at least dl=ke times by
the tracing algorithm. So, we have a k resilient traceability scheme. 2
If we represent a user u's personal key as a codeword of length l, over an alphabet
of size d, where d is the size of each bucket, i.e., P (u) = (h1(u); h2(u);    ; hl(u)),
we can rephase the requirement as follows.
Corollary 3.2.4 If there is a code C with n codewords, with length l, over an
alphabet of size d, such that the Hamming distance of C is more than l  l=k2, then
there is a k-resilient traceability scheme with n users, ld base keys, and each user
has l keys.
Proof: Since C has distance more than l   l=k2, every two codewords must have
less than l=k2 entries in common. So, for every pair of distinct users u; v, we have
j hi; 1  i  l : hi(u) = hi(v) j< l=k2. 2
The property stated in the above theorem is stronger than the property required
by the one level scheme. The following example illustrates why.
Example 3.2.5 Consider a scheme with 12 base keys, and 9 users, in which each
user gets 4 keys. There are 4 buckets, each bucket has key 0, 1, and 2. The columns
of the following matrix A = [aij] represent the hash functions, h1; h2; h3; h4, each
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row represents the keys assigned to a user, aij = hj(i), i.e., the key in bucket j




0 0 0 0
2 1 1 0
2 2 0 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 2
1 2 2 0
2 0 2 2
0 2 1 2
0 1 2 1
1
CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
We claim this is a fully 2-traceability scheme.
Let a, b be two codewords of length n over an alphabet Q. Dene the set of
descendants D(a; b) by
D(a; b) := fx 2 Qnjxi 2 fai; big; 1  i  ng
Let ri; 1  i  9, denote the ith row of A. Suppose a, b are two traitors. Then
D(ra; rb) is set of all possible key assignments a and b can construct in order to
decrypt contents. Let r
0
denote the four keys found in a pirate decoder constructed
by a, b. Then r
0 2 D(ra; rb). And notice d(r0; ra)+d(r0; rb) = d(ra; rb), where d(x,y)
denotes the hamming distance between x; y 2 Qn.
Now, notice that any two rows in A have hamming distance 3. So there exists
i 2 fa; bg, such that d(r0; ri)  1. WLOG, say d(r0; ra)  1, i.e., a will be marked at
least 3 times by the tracing algorithm. Now consider d(r0; rj); 1  j  9; j 62 fa; bg.
Suppose exists a j such that d(r0; rj)  1, then d(ra; rj)  d(r0; rj) + d(r0; ra) 
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1 + 1 = 2. This contradicts the fact that any two rows in A have distance 3.
Thus we conclude d(r0; rj)  2; 1  j  9; j 62 fa; bg, i.e., no innocent user will
be marked more than twice by the tracing algorithm. Thus we have a 2-resilient
tracing scheme.
In this scheme, we have l = 4, k = 2, and l=k2 = 1. But any 2 rows have 1
entry in common. So j fhi; 1  i  4 : hi(1) = hi(2)g j= 1 6< 1. 2
In the above example, rows of A form a ternary hamming code of length 4.
Using the similar argument, we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2.6 If there exists a equidistant code C of length l, over an alphabet
Q, j Q j= q, with an odd distance, then there is a 2-traceability scheme, with j C j
users, lq base keys, each user has l keys. 2
We can also provide explicit constructions from transversal designs.
Denition 3.2.7 A t-transversal design t-TD(l,m) consists a collection B of m-
subsets (blocks) of a set X of lm elements (points), and a collection of l disjoint
m-subsets (groups) which partition X such that,
1. each block contains exactly one element from each group,
2. any t elements from dierent groups occur in exactly one block. 2
Then the following corollary of Theorem 3.2.3 is straight forward.
Corollary 3.2.8 If there is a t-TD(l,m) with n = mt blocks, then we have a k-
traceability scheme with n users, lm base keys, and each user has l keys, where
k = b
q
(l  1)=(t   1)c.
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Proof: Let X be the set of lm base keys, partition the lm keys into l groups of m
keys each as in the t-TD(l,m) transversal design. Each user is assigned the keys in
a unique block. Thus there can be n users and each user gets l keys. And any two




(l   1)=(t   1) =
l(t  1)
l   1 > t  1:
Thus any two users have less than l
k2
keys in common. By Theorem 3.2.3, we have
a k-traceability scheme. 2
t  TD(l;m) designs can be constructed from designs known as orthogonal ar-
rays.
Denition 3.2.9 An orthogonal array OA(t; l; s) is a l  st array, with entries
from a set of s  2 symbols, such that in any t rows, every t  1 column vector
appears exactly once. 2
Theorem 3.2.10 If there is a OA(t; l;m), then there exists a t-TD(l,m) with mt
blocks.
Proof: Suppose there is an OA(t; l;m) on elements 0; 1;    ;m  1. Add (i  1)m
to each element in the ith row of the OA, so the elements in the ith row are in
f(i   1)m; (i   1)m + 1; (i   1)m + 2;    ; im   1g. Let X= f0; 1; 2;    ; lm   1g.
Let Gi = f(i   1)m; (i   1)m + 1; (i   1)m + 2;    :im   1g; 1  u  l. Clearly
Gi; 1  u  l partition X into l groups of size m. Let each column of the OA be
a block. Then each block has exactly one element from each Gi; 1  u  l. Any
t elements from dierent groups Gi1 ; Gi2 ;    ; Git occur in one block, since in the
rows i1; i2;    ; it, any t-tuple occurs in exactly one column in the OA. Therefore,
we have a t-TD(l,m) with mt blocks. 2
The following corollary follows directly from Theorem 3.2.8 and Corollary 3.2.7.
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Corollary 3.2.11 Suppose there is an OA(t; l;m), then there exists a k-traceability
scheme, with m
t
users, lm base keys, and each user gets l keys, where
k = b
q
(l   1)=(t  1)c:
2
It is known that there exists an OA(t; q + 1; q) (Reed-Solomon Code), for all
prime power q and t < q. Thus by the above corollary, there is a b
q
q=(t  1)c
-traceability scheme with qt users, each user has q + 1 keys, and a total of q2 + q
base keys. And we have k = b
q
q=(t  1)c, n = qt, l = q + 1, v = q2 + q. Notice
l  tk2, where t = log
q















scheme is almost as eÆcient as the scheme whose existence was shown in Theorem
3.2.2, as long as, given k and n we can nd a prime power q and t < q such that
k  b
q
q=(t  1)c, and n  qt.
The following example is an OA(2,5,4) and hence a key distribution scheme for
a 2-traceability scheme with 16 users, in which each user has 5 keys and there are





0 3 2 1 3 0 1 2 2 1 0 3 1 2 3 0
3 0 1 2 2 1 0 3 0 3 2 1 1 2 3 0
2 1 0 3 0 3 2 1 3 0 1 2 1 2 3 0
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
1
CCCCCCCCCCCCA
There are 5 buckets, and each bucket has 4 keys: f0; 1; 2; 3g. User 1 (column 1)
gets key 0 in bucket 1, key 3 in bucket 2, and so on   . 2
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The following two lemmas provide some existence result for OAs. Their explicit
constructions are also known.
Lemma 3.2.13 If q is a prime power and t < q, then there exists an OA(t; q+1; q).
2
Lemma 3.2.14 If q is a prime power and t < q, l  q, then there exists an
OA(t; l; q). 2
Example 3.2.15 Let us consider a key assignment scheme such that we can trace
any coalition of 4 traitors. By Lemma 3.2.11, there exists an OA(2; 17; 16), (q =
24), and by Lemma 3.2.12, there exists an OA(2; 17; 17), (q = 17). Using the rst
OA as our key assignment scheme allows us to construct a 4-traitor tracing scheme,
with 16 17 = 272 base keys, 162 = 256 users, and each user has 17 personal keys.
Using the second OA, we obtain another 4-traitor tracing scheme, with 172 = 289
bases keys, 172 = 289 users, and each user has 17 personal keys. The second scheme
allows 33 more users at the cost of 17 more base keys. 2
Now, let us turn our attention to the eÆciency parameters. The data provider
has 8k3(k + 1) log n base keys. He has to perform the same number of encrypt
operations of E to encrypt secret shares s1; s2;    ; sl, and an additional encryption




A user has 4k(k+1) log n encryption keys and has to perform the same number of
decryption operations of E to obtain shares s1; s2;    ; sl, and a decryption operation
of E. Each enabling block contains the result of encrypting the secret shares using
8k3(k + 1) log n keys.
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Now, consider the tracing algorithm. The rst nested for loops (lines 2 to 7)
perform the decoding at most 2k2l = 8k3(k + 1) log n times. Assume the decoder
performs the same amount of work as a normal user. The rst nested for loops
performs 32k4(k + 1)2 log2 n + 8k3(k + 1) log n decryption operation of E. The
second nested for loops (lines 8 -11) has complexity O(nl) = O(nk2 log n). Then
the tracing algorithm has time complexity O((k6 log2 n)C + nk2 log n), where C is
the complexity of the decryption operation of the underlying scheme E.
3.3 Two Level Open Scheme
The two level traceability scheme presented here can be thought of as iterating the
one level scheme from the previous section.
Key Distribution: There are l buckets. In each of these buckets, instead of
base keys, there are b = deke one level key distribution schemes. We call these sub-
schemes, and denote the jth scheme in the ith bucket as Si;j. Each sub-scheme has
d baskets, each basket has 4 log2 k keys. We denote the yth key in the xth basket
in sub-scheme Si;j by ki;j;x;y. Each user gets one sub-scheme from each bucket, and
as in the one level tracing scheme, each user gets one key from each basket in each
of sub-scheme he is assigned to; Thus each user gets ld base keys. l and d are to
be determined later. Notice that there are 2 levels here: each upper level bucket
contains a set of sub-schemes in which there are a set of baskets that contain a set
of base keys.
We are going to choose two sets of hash functions. The rst set of l rst level
functions, h1; h2;    ; hl, each maps f1; 2;    ; ng to f1; 2; :::; dekeg. They are used to
assign one sub-scheme in each bucket to each user. A user u 2 U , gets sub-schemes:
fS1;h1(u); S2;h2(u);    ; Sl;hl(u)g.
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Keys in Basket x




Basket 1 Basket 2 ...... Basket x
Baskets in 
g   (u)=y
Bucket 1 Bucket lBucket 2 ... ...Bucket i
... S (i,j) (i,b)... S(i,1)S S




one sub-scheme in each bucket
each user gets exactly
one key in each basket
each user gets exactly
Figure 3.3: Base Keys in Two Level Open CFNP Scheme
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For each bucket i, and each j 2 f1; 2;    ; dg, there is a second level hash function
gi;j , which maps f1; 2;    ; ng to f1; 2;    ; 4 log2 kg. The function gi;j is used to map
each user u to a key in the jth basket of sub-scheme Si;hi(u).
Therefore the data supplier key has l  d  deke  4 log2 k base keys. And each
user's personal key is a set of l  d base keys:
P (u) = fk1;h1(u);1;g1;1(u); k1;h1(u);2;g1;2(u);    ; k1;h1(u);d;g1;d(u);
k2;h2(u);1;g2;1(u); k2;h2(u);2;g2;2(u);    ; k2;h2(u);d;g2;d(u);
...;
kl;hl(u);1;gl;1(u); kl;hl(u);2;gl;2(u);    ; kl;hl(u);d;gl;d(u)g:
Encryption: The data supplier chooses a key s in the key space of E. s gets
divided into l shares, s1; s2;    ; sl, such that Lli=1 si = s. Sub-schemes in bucket i
are used to encrypt and decrypt share si. si is further divided into d  deke shares,
si;j;c; 1  j  deke; 1  c  d, such that
si =
M
(si;1;1; si;1;2;    ; si;1;d)M
(si;2;1; si;2;2;    ; si;2;d)
...M
(si;deke;1; si;deke;2;    ; si;deke;d):
si;j;c; 1  j  deke; 1  c  d, is encrypted with all keys in the cth basket of
sub-scheme Si;j. The concatenation of all these encrypted shares form the enabling
block, so
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The cipher block is simply Bc = Es(M).
Notice, for each i, 1  i  l, a user u 2 U has d keys:
ki;hi(u);1;gi;1(u); ki;hi(u);2;gi;2(u);    ; ki;hi(u);d;gi;d(u):
These keys allow u to decrypt the shares:
si;hi(u);1; si;hi(u);2;    ; si;hi(u);2:
And hence to construct:
si =
M
(si;hi(u);1; si;hi(u);2;    ; si;hi(u);2)
Therefore, each authorized user can reconstruct s and decrypt the cipher block
to obtain the plaintext M .
Tracing: Suppose there is a pirate decoder D. To nd the key s, one needs to
nd all the shares among, s1; s2;    ; sl. Therefore, for every bucket i there should
be at least one sub-scheme Si;j that allows D to construct si. Suppose Si;ci is such
a sub-scheme. But to construct si in sub-scheme Si;ci, one needs to nd all values
of si;ci;1; si;ci;2;    ; si;ci;d. Thus D needs at least one key in each of d baskets in
sub-scheme Si;ci. Therefore, it is valid to assume that for any i, 1  i  l, there
exists at least one sub-scheme Si;ci, such that D has at least one key in each of d
baskets of Si;ci .
Let M i;j0;0 be an enabling block in which the encryption with the keys of all
the sub-scheme of bucket i, except Si;j are replaced with random data. So, Si;j
becomes the only sub-scheme used to encrypt si. Let M
i;j
x;y
be an enabling block
built from M i;j0;0 by replacing with random data the encryption with all the rst y
keys in the xth basket in subscheme Si;j. This has the same eect as removing








































































S 1S S liS ......
Figure 3.4: The Encryption and Decryption of a Session Key in a Two Level CFNP
Open Scheme
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Input: pirate decoder D
Output: one traitor
1. for 1  i  l, 1  j  deke do
2. if D decrypts experiment Ei;j0;0 with non-negligible probability then
3. ci = j
4. for 1  x  d do
5. for 0  y  4 log2 k do
6. repeat experiment Ei;j
x;y
r times,
7. let f i;j
x;y















= y; x++, goto 6
10. for each u 2 U , 1  i  l do
11. for 1  j  d do




14. scrtu ++, if crtu;i  dlog k
15. return u such that scrtu = MAXu2Uscrtu
Figure 3.5: Tracing Algorithm for Two Level Open Scheme
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keys ki;j;x;1; ki;j;x;y;    ; ki;j;x;y from the set of keys used to encrypt si;j;x. Let Ei;jx;y be
the following experiment: prepare an encryption session, with enabling block M i;j
x;y
.
The tracing algorithm is presented in Figure 3.5. Lines 1 to 10 determine a subset
F
0 of the keys in D, and lines 11 to 17 identify one traitor who has contributed
his personal keys in building D. This algorithm suers the same problem as the
tracing algorithm for one level open schemes. When the pirate decoder D has more
than one key in one basket, it could detect the operation of the tracing algorithm,
by discovering any inconsistency in the enabling block.
Notice that for each i, there is a subscheme Si;ci that enables D to obtain share
si, i.e., D has at least one key from each basket of sub-scheme Si;ci. Then D must
be able to decrypt Ei;ci0;0 , since all the keys in subscheme Si;ci are still valid in M
i;ci
0;0 .
Conversely, if D can decrypt Ei;ci0;0 successfully, D must have at least one key from
each basket of sub-scheme Si;ci, since the keys in the rest of sub-schemes in bucket
i are all invalid. Thus, D has at least one key in each baskets in subscheme Si;ci
if and only if D can decrypt experiment Ei;ci0;0 successfully. Here we assume D has
only one sub-scheme Si;ci which allows it to recover share si. Otherwise D can do
a comparison of the values of si obtained from dierent sub-schemes and detect
whether a tracing algorithm is running.
Lines 4 to 10 are essentially the same as the tracing algorithm in the one level
scheme. They are to nd one key in each basket which is in D. Let Fi denote the














And let F 0 be the set of all keys inD detected by the tracing algorithm, F 0 = [l
i=1Fi.
So j Fi j= d, and j F 0 j= l  d.
We call a user a suspect for si if crtu;i  dlogk . So a user is a suspect for si if u's
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personal key in bucket i has at least d
logk
base keys in common with Fi. We declare
the user who is a suspect for the largest number of si's as a traitor.
We would like to show that there exists a choice of hash functions, hi; gi;j; 1 
i  l; 1  j  d, such that no coalition of at most k traitors can frame an innocent
user.
Consider a specic user u 2 U , and specic coalition T of size k which does
not include u. We are going to bound the probability that user u will be a suspect
for si. We rst nd a bound on the probability that user u will be hashed to a
sub-scheme with more than blog kc traitors in a given bucket.
Lemma 3.3.1 The probability that more than blog kc traitors are hashed by a ran-





Proof: There are a total of dekek ways to hash the k traitors into deke sub-schemes.
The number of ways that there are at least b traitors hashed to a specic sub-scheme











CA is the number of ways to choose b traitors out of a possible k traitors,
and dekek b is the number of ways to hash the remaining k   b traitors into deke
sub-schemes.
Therefore the probability of more than blog kc traitors are hashed to a specic


































(j) = fu 2 U jhi(u) = jg; 1  j  deke:
Let hi(u) = ci. Consider the conditional probability space where there are at most
blog kc traitors in h 1
i
(ci). We are going to show that the probability that u is a




Lemma 3.3.2 Suppose there are at most blog kc traitors in h 1i (ci). The probability
that u being marked at least
d
logk
times is at most
1
16k







Proof: Let Pi(u) denote u's keys in sub-scheme Si;ci,
Pi(u) = fki;ci;1;gi;1(u); ki;ci;2;gi;2(u);    ; ki;ci;d;gi;d(u)g
Let Fi denote the keys detected by the tracing algorithm in the sub-scheme,
Fi = fki;c;1;ti;c1 ; ki;c;2;ti;c2 ;    ; ki;c;d;ti;cd g:
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u will not get marked for the jth basket unless there exists a t 2 T \ h 1
i
(c) such




There are 4 log2 k keys in a basket. At most log k of them are assigned to some
member in T \ h 1
i
(c) which has cardinality at most blog kc. So the probability


















j=1Xj is the number of marks u gets. Now, apply Corollary 3.1.2, substituting
p = 1
4 log k
































































if k  16
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Therefore the probability that u gets more than d
log k
is at most 1
16k
, when k  16.
2
Recall that a user u is a suspect with respect to si, if u gets marked more than
d
log k
in the subscheme Si;hi(u). So, the probability that u being marked at least
d
logk
times is at most 1
16k
, when k  16, if there are at most blog kc traitors in h 1
i
(ci).
Now, we are ready to bound the probability that u is suspect to any si; 1  i  l.
Lemma 3.3.3 The probability that u is suspect to any si; 1  i  l, is at most 18k ,
if k  16.
Proof: Let As denote the event that u is a suspect with respect to si. Let Am
denote the event that u is mapped by hi to a same sub-scheme with no more than
blog kc traitors.
Suppose hi(u) = c, then Pr(Am) is same as the probability of more than blog kc




















since k2  16k when k  16
By Lemma 3.3.2, Pr(AsjAm)  116k . The probability that u is a suspect with
respect to si is:
Pr(As) = Pr(As; Am) + Pr(As; Am)
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= Pr(AsjAm)Pr(Am) + Pr(AsjAm)Pr(Am)
 1
16k











Let us consider the probability that u is a suspect for at least 3l
4k
of the buckets.
Lemma 3.3.4 The probability that u is a suspect for at least 3l
4k
of the buckets is
at most 1   2 lk .




1 if u is a suspect for si
0 otherwise:
(3.3)
Now, apply Corollary 3.1.2 again, substituting p = 1
8k
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So, the probability that u is a suspect for at least 3l
4k




Call a bucket bad if it contains a sub-scheme into which more than blog kc
traitors are mapped, and good otherwise. Notice that in a good bucket, there are
at most blog kc traitors mapped to any sub-scheme in the bucket. Let Si;ci denote
the sub-scheme in bucket i, such that F 0 has exactly one key from each basket of





baskets in Si;ci, and therefore a suspect of si. So, there is at least one traitor is
declared as a suspect in a good bucket. Let l0 denote the number of good buckets.
Next we want to show that the probability that l0 < 3l
4
is small.
Lemma 3.3.5 The probability that there are at least l
4
bad buckets is at most 2
 l
5 ,
when k  48.
Proof: By Lemma 3.3.1, the probability that more than blog kc traitors are hashed






. Thus the probability that there








deke see proof of Lemma 3.3.3
 1
48k




Therefore, the probability that a bucket is bad is at most 1
16
when k  48 .




1 if bucket i is bad
0 otherwise:
(3.4)
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Now, apply Corollary 3.1.2 again, substituting p = 1
16










































Thus the probability that there are at least l
4
bad buckets is at most 2
 l
5 . 2
We are ready to prove the main theorem in this section.
Theorem 3.3.6 There exists a choice of hash functions hi; gi;j; 1  i  l; 1  j 











+ k log(n+ 1), when k  48.
Proof: Suppose there are less than l
4
bad buckets, so at least 3l
4
good buckets. By
Lemma 3.3.5 this happens with probability of at least 1  2 l5 . Recall that at least
one traitor who is declared a suspect in a good bucket. Since there are at least 3l
4
good buckets, and there are k traitors, there exists at least one traitor is suspect
for at least 3l
4k
si's. Therefore the probability that u is mistakenly identied as a





k by Lemma 2.4.





CA possible coalition of size k, and
given that there are at least 3l
4
good buckets, some innocent user is mistakenly
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CA  2 lk . And, the probability that for some
coalition there are less than 3l
4





CA  2 l5 .
Thus the probability of any innocent user is mistakenly identied as a traitor is
at most,
















with k  5.





+ k log(n+ 1), then





CA  2 (k log( enk )+log(n+1))














Therefore, there exists a choice of hash functions hi; gi;j ; 1  i  l; 1  j  d,
such that an innocent user is never mistakenly identied as a traitor. 2
Now, let us consider the IeÆciency parameters. In the above scheme, there are





+ k log(n + 1) buckets, each bucket contains b = deke sub-schemes.
And, there are d = 3
8
log2 k baskets in each sub-scheme, each basket contains 4 log2 k
keys. Each enabling block consists of the result of encrypting the secret shares using
the same number of keys.
The data provider has
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keys. The same number of encryptions are needed to encrypt secret shares: si;j;c,
1  i  l, 1  j  b, 1  c  d. And, an additional encrypting operation of E is
required to encrypt the message M .
A user has




















encryption keys and has to perform the same number of decryption operations of
E to obtain suÆcient shares in order to obtain the session key s. One additional
decryption operation of E is required to obtain the content.
Now, consider the tracing algorithm. The rst part (lines 1 to 10) of the algo-
rithm consists of four nested loops and performs up to




















decryptions using decoder D. Assume the decoder performs the same amount of






































where C is the complexity of the decryption operation of the underlying scheme E.
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3.4 One Level Secret Scheme
Secret schemes can be made more eÆcient than open schemes since the traitors do
not have the knowledge of which keys other user received. In a secret scheme, even
if the set of keys of the coalition of traitors includes a large number of the personal
keys of an innocent user, the traitors do not know which keys the user has and
hence cannot put together a pirate decoder that frames a specic user.
The one level secret scheme is very similar to the one level open scheme, except
that there are 4k keys in each bucket instead of 2k2 in the open scheme. The l hash
functions, hi; 1  i  l, map f1; 2;    ; ng to f1; 2;    ; 4kg. The encryption scheme
and tracing scheme is same as in the one level open scheme.
Lemma 3.4.1 There exists a choice of hi; 1  i  l, such that the probability that
there exists a coalition T of size k traitors that can frame an innocent user u 2 U nT
is at most p, for any p 2 [0; 1].
Proof: Let hi; 1  i  l be a set of l randomly chosen hash functions that each
maps f1; 2;    ; ng to f1; 2;    ; 4kg. Let u be any user. Let Au denote the event
that u can be framed by a coalition T, u 62 T; j T j= k.
Recall that the tracing algorithm is going to identify l keys, one from each
bucket, in a pirate decoder D. Let F 0 denote the set of keys detected by the tracing
algorithm. Then F 0 = fk1;c1; k2;c2;    ; kl;clg. And, there is at least one traitor t
with crtt  l=k. Let A0u denote the event that u gets marked at least lk times.
Clearly Pr(Au)  Pr(A0u).
As the hash functions are randomly chosen, the value hi(u) is uniformly dis-
tributed in f1; 2;    ; 4kg. Let T be any coalition of size k. Since T has no knowl-
edge on hi(u), it has to randomly choose a key ki;ci 2 F to be exposed by the
CHAPTER 3. SYMMETRIC SCHEMES 45
tracing algorithm. The probability of hi(u) = ci is
1
4k
. Notice this probability does
not depend on which coalition builts D. So, the probability of u being marked with
respect to bucket i is 1
4k
.










j=1Xj is number of marks u will get.
Apply Corollary 3.1.2, substituting p = 1
4k













































So Pr(Au) < 2
 3l
4k . Then the probability that there exists an innocent user being
framed by any coalition is Pr(A) =
P
u2U Pr(Au) = n  Pr(Au) < n  2
 3l
4k . If we
choose l  4
3
k log(n=p), then
Pr(A) < n  2  log(n=p)




Theorem 3.4.2 There exists a secret (k; p)-resilient scheme, for any p 2 [0; 1].
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Proof: By Lemma(3.4.1), the probability of a innocent user being framed is at
most p, when l  4
3
k log(n=p). Therefore, if we choose hash functions hi, 1  i  l
randomly, the probability of an innocent user is mistakenly identied as traitor is




If we choose l  4
3
k log(n), then Pr(A) < 1. This tells us that there exists a
choice of hi; 1  i  l such that no user will be framed by any coalition. That is,
there exists a fully k-resilient scheme with l > 4
3
k log(n). 2
In the above one level fully (p; k)-resilient secret scheme, the data supplier has
4
3
k log(n=p) 4k = 16
3
k
2 log(n=p) = O(k2 log(n=p)) base keys. He has to perform the
same number of encrypting operations to encrypt secret shares s1; s2;    ; sl, and
an additional encrypting operation of E to encrypt the message session M using




A user has 4
3
k log(n=p) = O(k log(n=p)) encryption keys and has to perform the
same number of decryption operations to obtain shares s1; s2;    ; sl.
Now, consider the tracing algorithm in Figure 3.2. The rst nested for loop
performs the decryption at most 4kl = 16
3
k
3 log(n=p) times. Assume the decoder

















tion operation of E. The second nested for loops has complexitynl = 4
3
nk log(n=p)).
Then the tracing algorithm has time complexity O(k4(log2(n=p))C + nk log(n=p)),
where C is the complexity of the decryption operation of the underlying encryption
scheme E.
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3.5 Two Level Secret Scheme
Here, we are going to present a two-level (p; k)-resilient secret scheme which im-
proves the performance of the one level (p; k)-resilient secret scheme. The dierence
between this scheme and the open two level scheme is that here it is enough to use
only one mapping at the rst level.
The scheme uses one random hash function h : f1; 2;    ; ng 7! f1; 2;    ; 2ek
b0
g,








Lemma 3.5.1 For any xed coalition of k traitors, the probability that b or more
traitors are mapped to the same element in f1; 2;    ; 2ek
b0
g by h is at most p=2, if
b = log(4=p).










. Then the probability that there exists an element
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Input: pirate decoder D
Output: one traitor
1. for 1  i  r do
2. randomly choose a permutation  on f1; 2;    ; 2ek
b0
g.
3. for 1  l  2ek
b0
do
4. use D on experiment E(j)
5. let Ec be an experiment which D decrypts with nonnegligible probability.
6. perform one level tracing algorithm on scheme Sc
Figure 3.6: Tracing Algorithm for Two Level Secret Scheme
2
We are going to construct a secret one level (p=2; b)-resilient scheme for each set
h
 1(i) = fu 2 U jh(u) = ig; 1  i  2ek
b0
. Let S1; S2;    ; S 2ek
b0
denote these schemes.
Each user u receives his personal key in subscheme Sh(u).
Given a message session M , a session key s is randomly chosen. Let Bi
e
; 1  i 
2ek
b0
denote the enabling block in sub-scheme i with respect to session key s. The
concatenation of enabling blocks of all sub-schemes form the enabling block of the
two level scheme, Be = k
2ek
b0
i=1Bie. The cipher block is Bc = Es(M).
Any user u has keys from sub-scheme Sh(u) and thus can reconstruct s from
Bh(u)
e
. For a decoder D to decrypt M successfully, D must have a valid personal
key from a sub-scheme, i.e., there must be a sub-scheme Sc such that D contains
at least one key from each bucket in Sc.
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Let Mi be an enabling block in which the encryption with the keys of all the
sub-schemes except Si are replaced with random data. Let Ei be the experiment:
prepare an encryption session, with enabling block Mi. Figure 3.6 presents the
tracing algorithm. It is assumed that there exists a subscheme Sc such that D
contains at least one key from each bucket in Sc. Then D should encrypt Ec
successfully. Clearly, the algorithm will work if D always use one subscheme in
decoding. Since each user is assigned to one subscheme, D could have access to
as many as k subschemes. And D could choose one subscheme out of a set of S0
of k0  k available subschemes to use for a session. Note, D can also detect if a
tracing algorithm is running by using several subschemes to decode the content and
checking if the result is the same. But this involves more work than decrypting two
shares.
Let S0 = fS1; S2;    ; Sk0g, and let Pri denote the probability that Si is chosen
by D. Clearly, Pk0
i=1 Pri = 1. For a particular subscheme Si 2 S0, the probability
that it is not chosen in experiment Ei is 1  Pri. Then the probability that there
















If we repeat each experiment r times, the probability is at most e r. Table 3.1
gives the values of e r for some r between 1 and 20. If r = 5, the probability is
at most 0.00674; if r = 10, probability is at most 0.0000454. We can choose r so
that the algorithm can identify a subscheme used by D with a high probability.
Once such an Sc is found, the one level tracing algorithm can be used to identify a
traitor.
Theorem 3.5.2 The scheme described above is a (p; k)-resilient secret scheme, for
any p 2 [0; 1].







12 :6144212359  105
15 :3059023209  106
17 :4139937724  107
20 :2061153626  108
Table 3.1: Values of e r
Proof: We would like to show that the probability of an innocent user being
identied as a traitor is less than p. Let Am denote the event that there is no
subscheme into which at least b traitors are mapped together, where b = log(4=p).
By Lemma 3.4.1 Pr(Am)  (p=2). Let Af denote the event that an innocent user
is mistakenly identied as a traitor. Since each subscheme is (p=2; k)-resilient, the
probability of event Af is at most p=2, if event Am occurs. So, Pr(Af jAm)  p=2.
Now we have
Pr(Af ) = Pr(Af ; Am) + Pr(Af ; Am)
= Pr(Af jAm)Pr(Am) + Pr(Af jAm)Pr(Am)
 p
2








Therefore we have a (p; k)-resilient scheme. 2
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In the two level (p; k)-resilient secret scheme, the data supplier has all the keys
in the 2ek
b0

























































































The same number of encryption operations are needed to encrypt secret shares,
plus one additional encryption operation has to be performed to encrypt the actual
content.
Each user u gets the personal key in the one level schemeSh(u). So each user gets
4
3
b log(2n=p)) = O(log(n=p) log(1=p)) base keys, and performs the same amount of
decryption operations to decrypt enough secret shares, plus one more to decrypt
the content.
The size of the enabling block is the sum of the sizes of the enabling blocks




2 log(2n=p)). So the size of the enabling block in the two level scheme is
16
3













which is same as the num-
ber of encryption operations the data supplier has to perform to encrypt secret
shares of the session key.
The rst part (lines 1 to 5) of the tracing algorithm performs r 2ek
b0
decodings
using the decoder D, where r  20. Assume D performs the same amount of work
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decryption operation of E. The one level tracing algorithm has complexity
O(k4(log2(n=p))C + nk log(n=p))
.
The following theorem states that if k is smaller than b
2p
, then the total number






























= 2b 3  b
 eb 3  b:
Then,

























) (b+ 1) ln ek
b
 b2   b
) ln ek
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)C) plus the complexity
of the one level tracing algorithm.
3.6 One Level Threshold Scheme
In fully resilient tracing schemes, a decoder D either can decrypt all the sessions, or
cannot decrypt any session at all. For example, in one level schemes, if D has one
key from each bucket, D can decrypt all sessions successfully; Otherwise D cannot
decrypt any session. And the tracing algorithm can trace one source of the keys in
D if and only if D can decrypt all the sessions.
In the threshold schemes introduced in this and the next section, we are going
to allow D to decrypt certain subset of but not necessarily all sessions. And the
tracing algorithm can trace a source of the keys in D, only if D can decrypt at least
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certain percentage of the sessions. These schemes are useful in those applications
where a decoder which does not decode close to 100 percent of message successfully
is not very useful. For example, no one will probably buy a pirate TV decoder
which can decode only 90 percent of the pictures. For these applications, the fully
resilient schemes might be an overkill if we can construct threshold schemes that
are more eÆcient. We are going to consider schemes that trace the source of the
keys in a decoder only if the decoder can decrypt with a high success rate, but does
not necessarily perform well if the decoder has a low success rate.
In this section we are going to present a one level q-threshold tracing scheme:
a scheme traces the source of keys in any decoder which decrypts correctly with a
probability at least q. The benet of using such a threshold scheme is a reduction
in the size of enabling blocks, and hence a reduction in redundancy overhead. And
user will perform less decryption operations. In fact, the number of share needs to
be decrypted could be as few as 1.
The one level threshold scheme has the same key distribution scheme as a one
level fully resilient secret scheme. However in the encryption of the message, the
session key s is divided into t  l shares, s1, s2,   , st, such that s = Lti=1 si,
instead of l shares in one level secret scheme. t buckets B0 = fBa1; Ba2;    ; Batg
are chosen uniformly at random from the l available buckets. si is encrypted with
all the keys in Bai using E. And the enabling block also includes the indices of









: Any authorized user
has one key from each bucket and can always decrypt all si; 1  i  t, and hence
reconstruct s. And any decoder that can reconstruct s must have a key in all of
the buckets in B 0.
The threshold scheme has another parameter w, 0 < w < 1, such that the
tracing algorithm is able to trace the source of the keys in a pirate decoder D if D
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has at least one key from at least wl buckets. t is chosen such that if D decrypts
with probability at least q, then D must have one key from at least wl buckets.
Let B denote the set of buckets in which D has at least one key. j B j= d.
Then the probability that a randomly chosen bucket is in B is d
l
. The probability






. Given any message
session, D is able to decrypt it if and only if B0  B. Since B0 are randomly












t  q. We can set t = log
w
q. Then





, which implies w  d
l
, d  wl, i.e., D has one key in at least wl
buckets. To have t = 1, we can set w = q.
The tracing algorithm is presented in Figure 3.6. Let  = fk1; k2;    ; k4klg
denote the set of all base keys. Lines 1 to 9 identify at least lw keys in D where all
of these lw keys belong to distinct buckets. Let Ei denote the experiment of using
Mi as enabling block in a message block. Since M0 is a valid enabling block, D
should decrypt E0 with probability at least q. We built Mi fromMi 1 by replacing
the data encrypted with key k(i) by random data. So, the knowledge of k(i) will
not help in decrypting Ei. It has the same aect as removing the key k(i) from its
bucket. Now if D uses this key in decoding, D will in fact have only lw   1 keys
and hence decrypt with a probability less than q. Here again, we have to assume
D has at most one key from each bucket. Otherwise the algorithm will not work
and D can easily detect whether it is being inquired by a tracing algorithm.
So in E4kl, we have removed all the keys. D would decrypt it with a negligible
probability much less than q. Thus there exists a c such that D decrypts Ec 1 with
probability at least q but decrypts Ec with probability less than q. Thus k(c) must
be in D, since removing k(c) results in D having keys from less than lw buckets.
And suppose k(c) is from bucket Bd, then k(c) must be the last key D has in Bd.
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Input: pirate decoder D
Output: one traitor
1. set F 0 = ; and build a valid enabling block M0
2. randomly choose a permutation  of f1; 2;    ; 4klg
3. for 1  i  4kl do
4. build Mi from Mi 1 by replacing the data encrypted with key k(i) by
random data.
5. if D decrypts message block with enabling block Mi with probability less
than q
6. F 0 = F 0 [ f(i)g










CA , w = q1=t
9. Choose F 0  F 0, such that F' has exactly one key from wl buckets.
10. for each u 2 U do
11. for each c 2 F 0 do
12. crtu ++ if hi(u) = c
13. return u such that crtu = MAXu2Ucrtu
Figure 3.7: Tracing Algorithm for One Level Threshold Scheme
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After removing k(c), D still has a key in at least lw   1 buckets, and so it can









CA . So, we modify q and w
accordingly and keep on. There should exist another c0 such that D decrypts Ec0
with probability less than q (modied), but decrypts Ec0 1 with probability at least
q. So k(c0) must also be in D. And we update q and w accordingly and go on
until the end of loop. At the end of the loop, F 0 should have at least wl keys from
distinct buckets. Then each user is marked once for each of his personal key in F 0,
and the user with the most number of marks is claimed as a traitor.
Figure 3.8 gives a simpler randomized algorithm. This algorithm also assumes
D has at most one key from each bucket. In each iteration of the repeat loop (lines
2 - 8), one key is exposed. The repeat loop terminates when wl distinct keys are
exposed. Suppose D has q keys. Assume one key is randomly exposed at each
iteration. So, each of the q keys has a probability of 1
q
of being exposed at an
iteration. Then, after r iterations, the probability of one specic key is not exposed
is (1   1
q
)r. So the probability of there exists a key not exposed is p  q(1   1
q
)r.
Choose r = 20q, we have p  q(1  1
q
)20q  qe 20 which is negligibly small. Thus
the randomized algorithm is expected to terminate within 20lw iterations.
Notice there are at most k traitors, and there are wl keys in F 0. So there exists
a traitor t with crtt  wlk . We are going to show that there exists a choice of
hi; 1  i  l, such that the probability of an innocent user u gets at least wlk marks
is small.
Lemma 3.6.1 There exists a choice of hi; 1  i  l, such that the probability that
there exists a coalition T of size k can frame an innocent user less than p, for any
p 2 [0; 1].
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Input: pirate decoder D
Output: one traitor
1. F 0 = ;
2. repeat
3. build a valid enabling block M0
4. randomly choose a permutation  of f1; 2;    ; 4klg
5. for 1  i  4kl do
6. buildMi fromMi 1 by replacing the data encrypted with key k(i) by
random data.
7. if D decrypts message block with enabling block Mi with probability
less than q
8. F 0 = F 0 [ f(i)g
9. until j F 0 j = wl
10. for each u 2 U do
11. for each c 2 F 0 do
12. crtu ++ if hi(u) = c
13. return u such that crtu = MAXu2Ucrtu
Figure 3.8: Randomized Tracing Algorithm for One Level Threshold Scheme
CHAPTER 3. SYMMETRIC SCHEMES 59
Proof: Let u be any user. Let Au denote the event that there is a coalition T can
frame u, j T j= k; u 2 U n T . Let A0
u
denote the event that crtu  wlk . Clearly,
Pr(Au)  Pr(Au), since there exists a traitor t with crtt  wlk . Let D denote a
decoder built by T that decrypts with success rate at least q.
As the hash functions are randomly chosen, the value hi(u) is uniformly dis-
tributed in f1; 2;    ; 4kg. We want to determine the probability that D exposing
ki;hi(u) as its key. Notice the algorithm exposes wl keys in D. The probability that
one of the keys is from bucket i is w. Suppose D chooses to expose a key from
bucket i. Since T has no knowledge on hi(u), it has to randomly choose a key
ki;ci 2 F to be exposed by the tracing algorithm. The probability that hi(u) = ci is
1
4k
. The probability that T exposes the key ki;hi(u) is
w
4k
. Notice that this probability
does not depend on which coalition builts D. So, the probability of u being marked
with respect to bucket i is w
4k
.










j=1Xj is number of marks u will get.
Apply Corollary 3.1.2, substituting p = w
4k
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So, the probability that crtu  wlk is P (A0u) < 2
 3wl
4k , and P (Au) < 2
 3wl
4k . Then
the probability that there exists an innocent user who can be framed by a coalition





= n  P (Au
< n  2 3wl4k :
If we choose l  4k
3w
log(n=p), then
P (A) < n  2  log(n=p)




Theorem 3.6.2 There exists a q-threshold (k; p)-resilient scheme, for any p; q 2
[0; 1], with l  4k
3w
log(n=p).
Proof: By the above Lemma, there exists a choice of hi; 1  i  l such that the
probability that an innocent user can be framed is at most p for any p 2 [0; 1]
Therefore, if we choose hash functions hi; 1  i  l randomly, the probability of
an innocent user is mistakenly identied as a traitor is less than p. Hence we have
a fully (p; k)-resilient secret traitor tracing scheme, with l  4k
3w
log(n=p).
If we choose l  4k
3w
log(n), then P (A) < 1. This tells us that there exists a
choice of hi, 1  i  l, such that no user will be framed by any coalition. That is,
there exists a fully k-resilient scheme with l > 4k
3w
log(n). 2
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keys. But he has to perform only 4kt encryption operations to encrypt the secret
shares, where t is a parameter that can be picked by the data supplier such that
t = log
w










keys, but has to perform only t+1 decryption operations. Each enabling block has
a size of 4kt. We can set t = 1 by setting w = q.
The tracing algorithm performs 4kl decryptions using D. Assume D performs









decryption operations of E. The rest of the algorithm (lines 10 to 13) has time








C + kn log(n=p)
!
where C denotes the time complexity of performing a decryption using the under-
lying symmetric encryption scheme.
3.7 Two Level Threshold Scheme
The two level q-threshold (p; k)-resilient scheme presented in this section is con-
structed in the same way as the two level secret scheme. The scheme consists
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of 2ek
b
one level threshold schemes. A random hash function h : f1; 2;    ; ng 7!
f1; 2;    ; 2ek
b
g is needed to map a user to one of the 2ek
b
subschemes.





, the probability p
0
that b or more traitors are

































































Since p 2 [1
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2




Proof: Let q0 = qb
2ek
. We require each subscheme to be a q0-threshold (p=2; b)-
resilient scheme. That is, each subscheme can trace the source of the keys in a
decoder with a success rate of at least 1  p=2, if the decoder can decrypt correctly
with probability at least qb
2ek
. Notice that if a decoder D can decrypt none of the
subschemes with probability at least qb
2ek
, then the probability that D can decrypt










= q. Thus if a decoderD can decrypt
the two level scheme with probability at least q, there must exist a subscheme Sc,
such that D can decrypt with probability at least q0 = qb
2ek
. Since Sc is a q
0-threshold
(p=2; b)-resilient scheme, it can trace a traitor, with the probability of mistakenly
identify an innocent user as a traitor being at most p=2, if there are less than b
traitors mapped to Si by h.
Let Am denote the event that there is no sub-scheme to which b or more traitors
are mapped simultaneously. Let Af denote the event that the scheme fails to
identify a traitor, i.e., it claims an innocent user is a traitor.
By Lemma 3.7.1, P (Am)  p2 . Then the probability that the two level scheme
mistakenly claims an innocent user to be a traitor is
P (Af ) = P (Af ; Am) + P (Af ; Am)
= P (Af jAm)P (Am) + P (Af jAm)P (Am)
 p
2
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Input: pirate decoder D
Output: one traitor
1. for 1  i  r do
2. randomly choose a permutation  of f1; 2;    ; 2ek
b
g.
3. for 1  l  2ek
b
do
4. use D on experiment E(j)
5. let Ec be an experiment in which the probability that D decrypts correctly is
the lowest.
6. perform the one level tracing algorithm on scheme Sc
Figure 3.9: Tracing Algorithm for Two Level Threshold Scheme
Thus the two level scheme is a q-threshold (p; k)-resilient scheme. What remains
to be shown is a tracing algorithm to nd a subscheme which the pirate decoder
can decrypt with probability at least q0 = qb
2ek
.
Let Mi be an enabling block in which the encryption with the keys of all the
sub-schemes except Si are replaced with random data. Let Ei be the following
experiment: prepare an encryption session, with enabling block Mi. Figure 3.9
presents the tracing algorithm.
The tracing algorithm is very similar to the two-level secret scheme. We rst
need to nd the subscheme Sc that D can decrypt with probability at least q0 = qb2ek .
If D decrypts Ec with lowest success rate among all Ei, 1  i  2ekb , then D must
decrypt Sc with the highest success rate among all subschemes, since Ei disables
Si. And D must decrypt Sc with a success probability at least q0 = qb2ek . Then we
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can use the one level tracing algorithm on Sc to nd a traitor. 2




where q0 = qb
2ek




































base keys in total. The data supplier performs 4bt + 1 encryption operations in
each subscheme, where t = log
q0






Each user gets assigned to a sub-scheme and possesses the personal key in that















keys. A user has to perform
only t+ 1 decryption operations of E.
The tracing algorithm needs to perform r 2ek
b
decryption using D in order to
determine the sub-scheme which D is able to decrypt. Assume D performs the





operation of E are needed. The complexity of the algorithm is O( tk
b
)C plus the
complexity of the rst level tracing algorithm.
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3.8 A Variant of CFNP One Level Open Scheme
In this section, we are going to present a variant of CFNP one level schemes. These
schemes are suggested by Stinson and Wei in [14] and [15]. Let us call this scheme
an SW scheme. Explicit constructions are provided for these schemes.
Key distribution: As in CFNP schemes, the data supplier has a set  of base
keys chosen from the key space of a underlying symmetric encryption scheme E.
Let j  j= v,  = fk1; k2;    ; kvg. Each user will be assigned l keys. Let P (u)
denote the set of keys a user u receives. Note, the scheme does not require the
partition of  into buckets. The l keys can be any keys from , subject to that
P (u) will enable u to decrypt the content, and a traitor to be exposed. We will
discuss how the assignment is done later in this section.
Encryption: Similar to the CFNP schemes, the contents are divided into ses-
sions which has size as an integral multiple of the block size accepted by E. A
session key s is randomly chosen from the key space of E to encrypt one content
session. Then a (l; v) threshold secret sharing scheme is employed to produce v
shares, such that knowledge of any l of these shares would allow an user to obtain
s. Here we use Shamir's (l; v) threshold secret share scheme as an example.
Suppose s is in a eld F q. At rst v distinct non-zero values x1; x1;    ; xv 2F q
are chosen. These values are public and can be distributed before the broadcast.
The data provider chooses a1, a2,   , al 1 2F q independently at random. And let
a(x) = x(   (x(x+ al 1) + al 2)   + a1) + s:
So a(x) is a polynomial of degree l 1 in F q. The data supplier computes si = a(xi),
1  i  v. Each si is then encrypted with key ki using the underlying encryption
scheme E. The enabling block consists all encrypted shares, Be = kvi=1(Eki(si)).
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If a user u has l keys, ki1 , ki2 ,   , kil, he can decrypt shares si1 , si2,   ,
sil . With these l shares he can determine the polynomial a(x) by using Lagrange
interpolation. In fact u can compute
s = a(0) =
lX
j=1






Since xi; 1  i  v are public values available before broadcasting, each user can
compute them in advance.
Now, suppose a pirate decoder D can also decrypts the content. Assume the
underlying encryption schemeE is computationally secure. Since an (l; v)-threshold
scheme is used, D must be able to obtain at least l shares of si, 1  i  v from the
enabling block. In order to decrypt l shares, D must obtain l keys. Thus we can
assume that D must know at least l keys if it can decrypt content successfully.
Tracing algorithm: Let us rst assume that a pirate decoder D has a set of
l
0  l keys, ki1 ; ki2 ;    ; kil0 , and always uses them in the construction of s, i.e. D
always computes
s = a(0) =
l0X
j=1






Then if we replace any one share of si1; si2 ;    ; sil0 with random data. D will
compute an incorrect s and fail to decrypt the content.
The tracing algorithm is presented in Figure 3.10. In each iteration of the rst
for loop, we remove a share s(i). If D decrypts successfully using enabling block
Mi, then D does not use s(i) in decoding. If D fails, we know D has key k(i), and
uses it in decryption. But, then we restore that share so that D can still decrypt.
Unfortunately, the algorithm will work only when D always use a certain set
of l0  l keys in decryption. If D has more than l keys and randomly chooses l of
CHAPTER 3. SYMMETRIC SCHEMES 68
Input: pirate decoder D
Output: one traitor
1. randomly pick a permutation  on f1; 2;    vg
2. let M0 be a legitimate enabling block
3. for 1  i  v do
4. constructMi fromMi 1 by replacing the encrypted share s(i) by random
data. (this has the aect of removing share s(i))
5. try D on Mi
6. if D fails
7. Mi = Mi 1 (restoring share s(i))
8. F = F [ f(i)g
9. for each u 2 U do
10. compute j F \ P (u) j
11. return u with the highest value of j F \ P (u) j among U.
Figure 3.10: Tracing Algorithm for One Level Non-Transversal Tracing Scheme
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them in each session, we have to modify the algorithm, since if even D decrypts
correctly on enabling block Mi, it does not necessary mean D does not possess key
k(i), since it could be that k(i) was not chosen for this session. We need to perform
more decryption attempts on each enabling block Mi to make sure that D does not
possess k(i).
How many times do we have to perform the decryption on a particular enabling
block Mi? There are k traitors, D could have a set F of as many as kl distinct
keys, it can randomly choose l keys among F in each session. So for a particular
key in the probability it is chosen to decrypt is k 1
k
= 1   1
k
. If k attempts are





So if rk decryption attempts are performed, the probability is at most e r. We can
see from Table 3.1 that if we choose r  10, the probability that a specic key will
be chosen at least once after rk decryption attempts is very close to 1. Suppose
we perform 10k decryption attempts on enabling blocks Mi, and assume D does
not intentionally decrypt incorrectly. If D does not have key k(i), then decryption
will always succeed. Otherwise there is at least one failure with probability at least
0.9999546. Thus the algorithm will make rkv decryption attempts using D.
However this tracing algorithm suers a similar drawback as those in CFNP
schemes. If D has more than l keys, it can detect the operation of the tracing
algorithm. Suppose D has l + 1 keys and hence l + 1 shares. D can compute s
twice using dierent l shares chosen from the l+ 1 shares it has. If one of the l+1
keys is invalidated, then the two s computed would dier. This involves only a bit
more work than detecting the tracing algorithm in CFNP schemes.
Now, back to the key assignment. Suppose a coalition T of at most k traitors
builds a pirate decoder D. Let F be a set of l keys in D. F  [t2TP (t). We call
a user u exposed, if j F \ P (u) jj F \ P (v) j, for all v 2 U . We require that the
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exposed user is a traitor for any coalition of size at most k.
A set system is a pair (X ;B), where X is a set of elements called points and
B is set of subsets of X , the members of which are called blocks. A set system
can be described by an incidence matrix. Let (X ;B) be a set system, where X=
fx1; x2;    ; xvg and B= fB1; B2;    ; Bbg. The incidence matrix of (X ;B) is the




1 if xj 2 Bi
0 if xj 62 Bi
:
We can think the key assignment scheme as a set system, where X is the set of
base keys and B is the set of personal keys for each user. To satisfy the requirement
that every exposed user must be a traitor, let's consider the concept of a traceable
set system.
Denition 3.8.1 A traceable set system is a set system (X ;B), where jX j= v,
jBj= b, and every block has size l for some integer l, with the property that for
every choice of k
0  k blocks, B1; B2;    ; Bk0 2B, and any l-subset F  [k0i=1Bi,
there does not exist a block B 2BnfB1; B2;    ; Bk0g such that j F \Bi jj F \B j,
for 1  i  k0. We denote such a system by k-(l; b; v)-TSS. 2
Theorem 3.8.2 If there exits a k-(l; b; v)-TSS, there exists a k-resilient traitor
tracing scheme for n users with v base keys, and each user has l keys.
Proof: Suppose (X ;B) is a k-(l; b; v)-TSS, B= fB1; B2;    ; Bbg. We only need to
show that if we use (X ;B) as our key assignment scheme, i.e. P (u) = Bu, then any
exposed user is a traitor.
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Let T be a coalition of size at most k, T = fi1; i2;    ; ik0g; k0  k. Consider
any F that F  [t2TBt; j F j= l. Since (X ;B) is a k-(l; b; v)-TSS, there is no
B 2BnfBi1; Bi2;    ; Bik0g, such that
j F \Bij jj F \B j; 1  j  k0:
Then, there is no u 2 U n T such that
j F \ P (t) jj F \ P (u) j; for all t 2 T:
So, there must exist a t0 2 T such that
j F \ P (t0) j>j F \ P (u) j; for all u 2 U n T:
Now suppose t is an exposed user. Then
j F \ P (t) jj F \ P (t0) j>j F \ P (u) j; for all u 2 U n T:
So t 62 U n T , and t must be a traitor. 2.
In the rest of this section we are going to give some constructions of traceable
set systems.
Denition 3.8.3 A t-(v; l; ) design is a set system (X ;B), where jX j= v, j B j= l
for every B 2B, and every t subset of X occurs in exactly  blocks in B. The number

























where k = b
q
(l   1)=(t  1)c.
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Proof: Let (X ;B) be a t-(v; l; 1) design. Let B1; B2;    ; Bk0 ; k  k be k0 distinct
blocks. Let B 2BnfBi1; Bi2;    ; Bik0g. Let F  [k
0
i=1Bi; j F j= l. Notice there
exists a Bi; 1  i  k0 such that













(t  1)(l   1)
Since every t-tuple occurs in exactly one block, any 2 blocks have at most t  1
points in common. So j B \Bj j t  1; 1  j  k0. Then
j B \ F j  (t  1)k
= (t  1)b
q
(l   1)=(t  1)c

q
(t  1)2(l   1)=(t   1)
=
q
(t  1)(l   1)
< j F \Bi j















When t = 2, a t-(v; l; ) design is called a Balanced Incomplete Block Design
(BIBD). A (q2+q+1; q+1; 1)-BIBD is known to exits for every prime power q, and
is called a projective plane of order q. There are (q
2+q+1)(q2+q)
(q+1)q
= q2 + q + 1 blocks
in a projective plane of order q. Thus we have a
p
q  (q+1; q2+ q+1; q2+ q+1)-
TSS for any prime power q. And hence we have a
p
q-traitor tracing scheme with
q
2 + q + 1 base keys, q2 + q + 1 users and each user has q + 1 personal keys, for
every prime power q.
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Example 3.8.5 Here we present a 3-(10; 91; 91)-TSS. The set of points are in Z91.
Block Bi; 0  i  90 contains points,
Bi = f0 + i; 1 + i; 6 + i; 10 + i; 23 + i; 26 + i; 34 + i; 41 + i; 53 + i; 55 + ig;
where all arithmetic is done in Z91. This set system is a projective plane of order
9.
In fact D
0 = f0; 1; 6; 10; 23; 26; 34; 41; 53; 55g is a (91; 10; 1) cyclic dierence set.
A (v; l; ) cyclic dierence set is a set D = fd1; d2;    ; dlg such that each non-zero
element d 2Zv can be expressed in the form d = di  dj, in precisely  ways. It can
be easily veried that each nonzero element in Z91 can be expressed as a dierence
of two elements in D
0
in precisely one way.
It is known that if D = fd1; d2;    ; dlg is a cyclic (v; l; ) dierence set, then
D;D+1;    ;D+(v 1) are the blocks of symmetric (v; l; )-BIBD, where D+a =
fd1 + a; d2 + a;    ; dl + ag.
Thus
Bi = f0 + i; 1 + i; 6 + i; 10 + i; 23 + i; 26 + i; 34 + i; 41 + i; 53 + i; 55 + ig;
0  i  90, form a (91; 10; 1)-BIBD. 2
Example 3.8.6
D
0 = f0; 1; 20; 30; 35; 107; 125; 131; 153; 157; 174; 210; 219; 222; 233; 235; 266g
is a cyclic (273, 17,1) dierence set. Then D
0
;D
0+1;    ;D0+272 is a (273; 17; 1)-
BIBD, i.e. a projective plane of order 16. Thus we have a 4-(17; 273; 273)-TSS.
2
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And, a (q2; q; 1)-BIBD is called an aÆne plane or order q, and also exists for




= q2 + q blocks in an aÆne plane of order
q. So, an aÆne plane of order q is also a
p
q   1   (q; q2; q2 + q)-TSS.
An aÆne plane of order q can be obtained from a projective plane of order q
by removing the elements in a block B 0 from all other blocks. A block has q + 1
points, so there are q2 points left. Since no other block contains all q + 1 points
being removed, there are q2 + q blocks left. There are (q + 1)(q2) pairs with one
point in B0 and the other not in B0. There are q2 + q blocks, each block can only
have at most one point in common with B0, so has at most q pairs with one point in
B
0 nd the other not in B0. But q(q2+ q) = (q+1)(q2) which is the total number of
such pairs. So each block must have exactly q pairs and hence exactly one point in
B
0. Thus after removing the points in B0, each remaining block has q points each.
And every pair of remaining points occur in exactly one block, since it does occur
in B0. So, we have a (q2; q; 1)-BIBD, an aÆne plane of order q.
Example 3.8.7
D
0 = f0; 1; 3; 30; 37; 50; 55; 76; 98; 117; 129; 133; 157; 189; 199; 222; 293; 299g
is a cyclic (307; 18; 1) dierence set. Then D0;D0+1;    ;D0+306 is a (307; 17; 1)-
BIBD, i.e. a projective plane of order 17. So, if we remove all elements in any
one block we get a (289; 17; 1)-BIBD, an aÆne plane of order 17. Thus we have
a 4-(17; 289; 306)-TSS. Compared to the previous example, there are 16 more base
keys, and 33 more users, with same number of personal keys per user. 2
Denition 3.8.8 A t (v; l; ) packing design is a set system (X ;B), where jX j= v,
j B j= l for every B 2B, and every t subset of X occurs in at most  blocks in B.
2
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Theorem 3.8.9 If there exists a t-(v; l; 1) packing design with b blocks, then there
exists a k-(l; bv)-TSS, where k = b
q
(l   1)=(t  1)c.
Proof:Same as the proof for Theorem 3.8.2. 2
It is not known if t-(v; l; 1) design exist if v > l > t  6. However there are











They can be obtained from orthogonal arrays.
Theorem 3.8.10 If there exists an OA(t; l;m), then there exists a t-(lm; l; 1) pack-
ing design which has s
t
blocks.
Proof: If there is an OA(t; l;m) with entries from the set f0; 1;    ; s  1g. Dene
(X= f(x; y) : 0  x  l   1; 0  y  s   1g. For every column (y0; y1;    ; yl 1) in
the OA, dene a block B = f(0; y0); (1; y1);    ; (l  1; yl 1)g. Let B be the set of st
blocks constructed.
Suppose Bi; Bj 2B have a t-tuple in common. WLOG say (0; y0), (1; y1),   ,
(t; yt). Consider column i and j of the OA. The rst t entries of these 2 columns are
the same. This contradicts the fact that any t 1 column vector appears exactly
once in the rst t rows.
Therefore, any t-tuple occurs in at most one block in B, and (X ;B) is a t-
(lm; l; 1) packing design. 2
Recall that we also used an orthogonal array to construct a CNFP open one level
scheme in section 3.2. In fact the same orthogonal array can also used to construct
a traceability scheme introduced in this section. We know that an OA(t; q + 1; q)
exists for all prime powers q and t < q. Thus by the above theorem, there is a
CHAPTER 3. SYMMETRIC SCHEMES 76
b
q
q=(t  1)c -traceability scheme with n = qt users, where each user has l = q + 1
base keys, and there are total of v = q2 + q base keys. In fact, using OAs, the SW
schemes also has transversal property.
Using OAs as the key assignment scheme in the scheme presented here is not
as eÆcient as in the CNFP one level scheme, since the data provider and each user
has to perform extra computation due to the threshold secret sharing scheme.
Assume Shamir's (l; v) threshold secret sharing scheme is used. The data
provider has q2 + q keys which is same as in CNFP scheme. But he also has
to perform v polynomial evaluations to compute si = a(xi); 1  i  v. Each
evaluation can be done using l multiplications and l + 1 additions in F q. With
v = q2+ q, l = q+1, the data supplier has to perform q3+2q2+ q multiplications,
and q3 + 3q2 + 2q additions in F q.
As in a CNFP scheme, each user needs at least l decryption to obtain l shares.
But each user has to perform l multiplications and l additions to obtain s using
Lagrange interpolation, while in a CNFP scheme, only l   1 XORs are needed to
obtain s from l shares.
Recall that the tracing algorithm makes rkv decryption attempts using D. As-
sume D does the same amount of work as an user. The tracing algorithm would
perform rkv(l+ 1) decryption operations, rkvl additions and multiplications. The
complexity is O(kvlC + n), where C is the complexity of the decrypting operation
of E. If an OA(t; q + 1; q) is used, v = q2 + q, n = qt, l = q + 1, k = b
q
q=(t  1)c.
The running time is O(q3
1
2C + qt). The one level open CNFP scheme has a trac-
ing algorithm with complexity O(vlC + n). Using an OA(t; q + 1; q) as the key
distribution scheme, the tracing algorithm has complexity of O(q3C + qt).
The data redundancy is the same in both schemes. The tracing algorithm
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Schemes personal keys base keys data redundancy tracing algorithm
One Level O(k2 logn) O(k4 logn) O(k4 logn) O(k6(log2 n)C
Open Scheme +k6 log2 n)
Two Level O(k2 log2 k log n
k
) O(k3 log4 k log n
k
) O(k3 log4 k log n
k
) O(k5 log6 k(log2 n
k
)C
Open Scheme +nk2 log2 k log n
k
One Level O(k log n
k
) O(k2 log n
k





Secret Scheme +nk2 log n
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Two Level O(b log n
p
) O(kb2 log n
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Table 3.2: EÆciency Measures for CFNP Schemes
presented in this section needs v decryption attempts using a pirate decoder, which
is same as in CNFP scheme.
3.9 Summary
Table 3.2 gives a summary of the eÆciency measures of the six presented CFNP
schemes. In the rst four schemes the number of decryption operations each user
(i.e. his decoder) has to perform in each session is same as the number of personal
keys, since all personal keys are used in every session. In the two threshold schemes,
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each user performs only t = log
w
q decrypting operations. For the last four schemes,
the measures are for p-resilient schemes that can be obtained by choosing hash
functions randomly. Setting p = 1 we have the measures for fully resilient schemes
whose existence have been proved.
Not surprising, we can see that the secret schemes are more eÆcient than open
schemes in every aspect. While threshold schemes are less eÆcient than the secret
schemes in terms of personal keys and total base keys by a factor of 1
w
; q  w  1,
they reduce the amount of work each user and the data supplier have to perform,
as well as the data redundancy.
The one level open scheme has explicit constructions that are almost as eÆcient
as the existence result. No explicit construction are known for the two level open
scheme. The fully resilient version of the last four schemes do not have explicit
construction either, while it is possible to construct p-resilient version of the schemes
by choose hash functions randomly. But having a scheme which might identify an
innocent user as a traitor with probability p is generally not acceptable unless p is
really small, which leads to a substantial increase in almost every eÆcient measure.
Although the tracing algorithm in each scheme is able to identify at least one
traitor, it works only if the pirate decoder does not have redundant keys. For
example, in a one level open scheme, the tracing algorithm works only when the
pirate decoder has exactly one key for each bucket. The algorithm can be easily
defeated if the decoder has 2 keys in any bucket, by comparing the shares decrypted
using the 2 keys. Once the decoder detects that it is being inquired by a tracing
algorithm, it can fail the decoding intentionally. The assumption that no pirate
decoder has any redundant key does not seem to be a very valid one. SW schemes
suer from a similar problem.
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Schemes personal each user's base keys users tracing
keys work
CFNP using q + 1 q + 1 decrypt q2 + q qt O(q3C + qt)
OA(t; q + 1; q) q XOR
SW using q + 1 (q + 1) , q2 + q + 1 q2 + q + 1 O(q3 12C)
BIBD (q + 1) +,
(q2 + q + 1; q + 1 decrypt
q + 1; q)
Table 3.3: Comparison Between One Level Open CFNP and SW Schemes
Table 3.3 gives a comparison between one construction for CFNP and SW one
level schemes. The CFNP scheme uses an OA(t; q+1; q) as key distribution scheme
while the SW scheme uses a BIBD(q2 + q + 1; q + 1; q). Generally the CFNP
scheme allows more users when t > 2. Even when t = 2 although the SW scheme
accommodates more users, each user and the tracing algorithm has to do more work
because SW uses a (l; v) secret sharing scheme.
All of the above schemes are symmetric, since the data supplier knows every
user's personal key. If the data supplier is dishonest, he can easily frame any user
as a traitor. This leads to asymmetric traceability schemes that will be presented
in the next chapter.
Chapter 4
Asymmetric Tracing Scheme
All the schemes presented in the previous chapter are symmetric in the sense that
all the secret shares are encrypted and decrypted using the same keys. Each user
shares his personal key with the data supplier. One concern is that the data supplier
might be dishonest and frame any user as a traitor. This motivates research on a
tracing scheme that works like a public key cryptosystem, in which the encryption
key is public while the decryption key is kept secret. The two schemes introduced in
this chapter are asymmetric in the sense that the encryption key and the decryption
key are dierent. However they do not fully qualify as a truly public-key system, as
the decryption keys are assigned by the data supplier. Thus DS can still frame any
user at his will. These schemes do not provide non-repudiation. We will discuss a
truly public-key traceability system in the next chapter.
Both schemes presented here use an \asymmetric" encryption scheme to en-
crypt/decrypt session keys for each session. An o-the-shelf symmetric key encryp-
tion system is then used to encrypt/decrypt the actual contents using the session
key. Thus, in the following we are only concerned with how a session key is en-
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crypted by the data supplier and how it is decrypted by each user.
The rst such scheme was due to Kurosawa and Desmedt in 1998 [10]. The
encryption scheme is as secure as the ElGamal cryptosystem. However the tracing
algorithm was broken shortly after it was published. We present the scheme here to
illustrate a pitfall in designing an asymmetric key traceability scheme. The second
scheme was proposed by Boneh and Franklin in 1999 [3]. The encryption scheme
is based on the discrete log representation problem with respect to a xed base
of group elements. This scheme is secure if the decision DiÆe-Hellman problem is
hard in the underlying group. The tracing algorithm is equivalent to decoding a
received word to a codeword of an error correcting linear code of distance 2k + 1.
Given that a key is captured from a pirate decoder, the algorithm is able to trace
all of the traitors who have contributed to the decoder.
4.1 Kurosawa-Desmedt Scheme
Key generation and distribution: Let p be a prime power, and q be a prime
such that q j p   1, and q  n + 1. Let g be a qth root of unity over GF (p).
p, q, g are public information. Session keys are randomly chosen from the cyclic
multiplicative subgroup generated by g: S =< g >= fs j s = gi; 0  i  q   1g.
The data supplier chooses a random polynomial:
f(x) = a0 + a1x+    + akxk
where a0; a1;    ; ak 2Zq. Then he gives (i; f(i)) to user i as i's personal key. The
data supplier also computes:
y0 = g
a0 ; y1 = g
a1;    ; yk = gak
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in GF (p). The encryption key is (y0; y1;    ; yk).
Encryption/Decryption: To encrypt a session key s, the data supplier ran-
domly chooses an integer r and construct an enabling block:
(gr; syr0; y
r
1;    ; yrk):
From the enabling block each user i computes:
sy
r
0  (yr1)i  (yr2)i




















Thus each user can obtain s and decrypt the content.
Let us call the above encryption scheme the KD encryption scheme. It can be
shown that this encryption scheme is as secure as ElGamal encryption scheme.
Lemma 4.1.1 The KD encryption scheme is as secure as the ElGamal encryption
scheme in GF (p) if k = O(log p).
Proof: Let M1 denote the problem of nding s given (g; y); (gr; syr) in Zp where
y = ga, and a,r are secret. So M1 is the problem of breaking ElGamal encryption
scheme. Let M2 denote the problem of breaking the KD encryption scheme, i.e.,
nd s given (gr; syr0; y
r
1;    ; yrk) in GF (p) where y0 = ga0; y1 = ga1;    ; yk = gak , for
random secret values a0; a1;    ; ak; r. We would like to show there is an algorithm
solving M1 if and only if there is algorithm solving M2.
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First suppose there is an algorithm A1 that solves M1. Inputting (gr; syr0) to
A1 will give s and hence solveM2.
Next suppose there is an algorithm A2 that solves M2. We choose a1, a2,   ,
















Inputting (gr; syr; yr1;    ; yrk) to A2 will reveal s. The reduction is in polynomial
time if k = O(log p). 2
Tracing: The tracing algorithm is rather simple and does not support blackbox
tracing. It assumes the decryption keys in the decoder can be revealed and the key
has the form (i; f(i)). User i is declared as a traitor.
Let T be a coalition of at most k traitors. It can be showed that if T can
construct a pirate decoder with decryption key (u; f(u)) where u 62 T , then the
discrete logarithm problem can be solved.
Theorem 4.1.2 Let T be a coalition of at most k traitors, where k = O(log p).
If there is a polynomial time algorithm that allows the traitors in T to construct a
pirate decoder with decryption key (u; f(u)) where u 62 T , then there is a polynomial
time algorithm for the discrete log problem in GF (p).
Proof: Let T = fi1; i2;    ; ik0g. Let A1 be a polynomial time algorithm which
takes the encryption key of the tracing scheme and traitor's personal keys as input
and outputs a pirate decoder with decryption key (u; f(u)) where u 62 T . We
are going to present a polynomial time algorithm A2 which solves the discrete log
problem using A1 as a subroutine.
Suppose we are given an instance of the discrete log problem: g; y = ga. A2 rst
chooses d1; d2;    ; dk0 2 GF (p) at random. Then there exists unique polynomial
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f(x) = a + a1x +    + akxk0 such that f(ij) = dj, 1  j  k0. All the following
arithmetic is done in GF (p).

























(d1; d2;    ; dk0)T = (f(i1); f(i2);    ; f(ik0))T
= (a; a;    ; a)T +B  (a1; a2;    ; ak0)T :
Notice that B is a Vandermonde matrix, and hence it is nonsingular. So, we have
(a1; a2;    ; ak0)T = B 1  (d1   a; d2   a;    ; dk0   a)T :
Let (bj1; bj2;    ; bjk0) be the jth row of B 1. Then
aj = bj1(d1   a) + bj2(d2   a) +   + bjk0(dk0   a)














Notice that g; y; bj1;    ; bjk0; d1;    ; dk0 are all known. Thus gaj , 1  j  k0, can be
computed. Then (y; ga1; ga2;    ; gak0 ) is a valid encryption key for a KD scheme.
Further (ij; dj = f(ij)), 1  j  k0, are k0 valid decryption keys for the scheme.
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ApplyingA1, we obtain (u; f(u)), where u 62 T . Then A2 can interpolate f(x), using
(i1; d1), (i2; d2),   , (ik0; dk0) and (u; f(u)). Then a = f(0) which is the discrete log
of y.
A2 runs in polynomial time as long as A1 is a polynomial time algorithm, and
k = O(log p). 2
Everything seems sound. But, notice the tracing algorithm assumes that the
key in any pirate decoder has the form (u; f(u)). However, a pirate decoder does
not have to restrict itself to use a key in such a form, even though a legitimate
decoder uses (i; f(i)) as its decryption key. A pirate decoder can use a key in any
form as long as it allows the decryption of the content. We are going to present a
key in a dierent form which still allows the decryption of session keys, but which
prevents any traitors from being traced. This attack was adviced in [3] and [15].
Consider a coalition T of t  2 users. Let T = fi1; i2;    itg. Let vj =
(f(ij); 1; ij; i
2
j
;    ; ik
j
); 1  j  t. Consider a convex combination of vj's:




Let w = (u;w0; w1;    ; wk).
A pirate decoder can use w to decrypt a session key s from ciphertext
(gr; syr0; y
r
1;    ; yrk)
as follows: compute
(syr0)



























































jf(ij), we obtain s. Thus a
pirate decoder does not have to use a key having the form (u; f(u)) to decrypt s.
Hence the tracing algorithm devised above is useless in this situation.
Thus in designing a traceability scheme, one should not assume that all pirate
decoders work in the same way as a legitimate decoder. It is important for the
tracing algorithm to work regardless how a pirate decoder is implemented. Notice
that there is no such problem in the symmetric traceability schemes in the previous
chapter. If a secret share is encrypted using a key, then this key is usually the only
key that can be used to recover the secret share.
One way to thwart the above attack is to choose f(x) to be a polynomial of
degree 2k. Notice that any 2k+1 of vj = (1; j; j
2
;    ; j2k) are linearly independent.




i=1 ivji, i 6= 0; 1  i  t. Then w cannot be expressed as a linear
combination (with non-zero coeÆcients) of a dierent set of less than k+1 vectors
in V . Otherwise we have a set of less than 2k + 1 linearly dependent vectors.
If the above attack is used, then we are given w which is a convex combination
of less than k + 1 vj's. We know the set of vjs can produce such w is unique (with
non-zero coeÆcients). And the set of vj's can be identied by using coding theory
techniques. The Boneh-Franklin scheme introduced in the next session employs
such techniques.
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4.2 Boneh-Franklin Scheme
The Boneh-Franklin (BF) Scheme relies on the discrete log representation problem.






, we say (Æ1; Æ2;    ; Æt) is a representation of
y with respect to the basis (h1; h2;    ; ht). 2
Notice that if d1; d2;    ; dm are representations of y with respect to the same






i=1 i = 1, is also a
representation of y with respect to H.
Key generation and distribution: LetGq be a group of order q, g a generator
of Gq. Gq, g, q are public information. It is required that computing discrete logs
in Gq is diÆcult.
For i = 1; 2;    ; 2k, the data supplier randomly chooses ri 2Zq, and computes
hi = g
ri in Gq. The ri's are kept in secret. Furthermore, the data supplier randomly
chooses 1; 2;    ; 2k 2Zq and computes y = Q2ki=1 hii = g
P2k
j=1
rjj . The i's are
also kept secret by the data supplier. The encryption key is (y; h1; h2;    ; h2k).
A collection   of n codewords of length 2k is made public. In order for tracing
to work,   has to satisfy certain properties that will be discussed later. Let   =
f(1); (2);    ; (n)g. A private key is an element i 2Zq such that i  (i) is a
representation of y with respect to the basis H = (h1; h2;    ; h2k). User i's personal
key, i, is derived from the 






Sometimes, we also refer to the personal key as the representation d = i (i), since
a decoder requires a representation of y in order to decrypt.
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Encryption and decryption To encrypt a session key s 2 Gq, the data sup-
plier picks a random element a 2Zq, and sets the enabling block to
(sya; ha1; h
a
2;    ; ha2k):




















































In fact any representation (Æ1; Æ2;    ; Æ2k) of y with respect to H will allow the




















Let us call the above encryption scheme the BF encryption scheme. It can be
shown that this scheme is as secure as the ElGamal encryption scheme in Gq if k
is in the order of O(log q).
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Lemma 4.2.2 Breaking the ElGamal encryption scheme reduces to breaking the
BF encryption scheme in polynomial time in Gq, if k = O(log q).
Proof: First let us state the problem of breaking the BF encryption scheme M1:






random secrets ri; i 2Zq; i = 1; 2;    ; 2k, nd the value of s.
The problem of breaking ElGamal encryption scheme can be stated as M2: nd
s, given (g; y); (sya; ga), where y = g, a and  are random secret elements in Zq.
Suppose we have an algorithm A1 to solve M1, and want to solve an instance
of M2. We randomly genearate r2; r3; : : : r2k and let hi = g
ri, 2  i  2k. Further
let h1 = g. (Obviously there is a representation of y with respect to the basis
(h1; h2;    ; h2k). But A1 does not require the knowledge of any representation.)
Then we compute ha
i
= (ga)ri, 2  i  2k. Now we have an instance of M1:
(g; q; y; h1; h2;    ; h2k), (sya; ha1;    ; ha2k), where h1 = g; hi = gri for random ri; 2 
i  2k. Applying A1 will reveal the value of s.
k = O(log q) ensures that the reduction is taking polynomial time. 2
More strongly, BF encryption is semantically secure against a passive adversary
if the Decision DiÆe-Hellman problem (DDH) is hard in Gq.
Denition 4.2.3 The Decision DiÆe-Hellman problem (DDH) is the task of de-
ciding whether y = gab, given y; ga; gb, and g in a group Gq of order q, where g is
a generator of Gq.
A Decision DiÆe-Hellman algorithm A for a group Gq of order q is an algorithm
satisfying for some xed  > 0 and suÆciently large n,
j Pr[A(g; ga; gb; gab) = "true"]  Pr[A(g; ga; gb; gc) = "true"] j> 1
n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where c 6= ab mod p.
We say that a group Gp satises the DDH assumption if no polynomial time
DDH algorithm exists for Gp. 2
Informally speaking, a DDH algorithm is an algorithm which solves the DDH
problem with a probability better than 1
2
. If there is no eÆcient DDH algorithm in
Gq,, then the BF encryption scheme is semantically secure (i.e. an adversary can
learn nothing about the plaintext, except for its length, from ciphertext.).
Lemma 4.2.4 The BF encryption scheme is semantically secure against a passive
adversary in Gq, assuming that Gq satises the DDH assumption and k = O(log p).
Proof: Suppose the BF encryption scheme is not semantically secure. Then given







2;    ; ha2k); b 2 f0; 1g, an adversary can decide whether b = 0 or
1 with success rate p1 >
1
2
. We are going to provide a DDH algorithm A.
Suppose we are given g; ga; gb; y and have to decide whether y = gab. Algorithm
A rst chooses random values r2; r3;    ; r2k from Zq and computes hi = (ga)ri,
2  i  2k. Then it sets h1 = ga. Let the public key by (y; h1; h2;    ; h2k).
Now A picks b randomly from f0; 1g and constructs C = (mbgb; y; yr2;    ; yr2k).
C is given to the adversary. The adversary outputs b0 2 f0; 1g. If b = b0, then A
output "true"; otherwise A outputs "false".





, 2  i  2k. Thus C is
a valid encryption of mb. Then b = b
0 with probability p1. If y 6= gab, then C is a
encryption of a random message, and hence b = b0 with probability 1
2
.
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Therefore, the probability that A(g; ga; gb; gab) = "true" is p1, and the proba-
bility that A(g; ga; gb; gc) = "true" is 1
2
, where c 6= ab mod p. Since p1 > 12 , we have
a DDH algorithm. Clearly this algorithm is polynomial if k = O(log p). 2
However, note that the DDH assumption is a very strong assumption. There are
groups where the computational DiÆe-Hellman problem (given g; ga; gb, compute
g
ab) is believed to be hard, but the DDH assumption does not hold.
An example where this might be true is Z
p
for a prime p and generator g, The
computational DiÆe-Hellman problem is believed to be intractable in Z
p
. But,
given ga, gb, one can easily compute the Legendre symbol of gab. This gives an
immediate method to decide whether y = gab given y; ga; gb with a success rate
much better than 1
2
.
The following are some groups in which the DDH assumption holds:
1. Let p = 2p0+1 where p and p0 are primes. Let Qp be the subgroup of quadratic
residues in Zp. It is a cyclic group of prime order.
2. Let p = aq + 1 where both p and q are prime and q > p
1
10 . Let Qp;q be the
subgroup of Zp of order q.




are primes. Let T be the cyclic subgroup of
order (p  1)(q   1).
4. Let p be a prime and Ea;b=Fp be an elliptic curve where kEa;bk is a prime.
5. Let p be a prime and J be a Jacobian of a hyper elliptic curve over Fp with
a prime number of reduced divisors.
Tracing algorithm: The above two lemmas show that the BF encryption
scheme is "secure" if the adversary is given the encryption key and the ciphertext
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only. What if the adversary has a set of decryption keys in his hand? Can he
produce a dierent key which enbles the decryption without being traced? In order
to recover the session key s, one has to obtain the value of ya. An adversary can
either compute a or nd a representation of y with respect to basis H. It can be
easily shown that if one can obtain a from a set of representations of y with respect
to H then he can compute any discrete log problem in the group. So it is safe to
assume that the adversary cannot compute a.
Can an adversary compute a presentation of y with respect to H? Let D =
fd1; d2;    ; dmg be a set of known encryption keys. Here we think encryption keys
as representations of y with respect to basis H. Recall that any convex combination
of vectors in D is also a representation of y with respect to H. FromD, an adversary
can easily construct a convex combination of vectors in D. Boneh and Franklin
suggested that these convex combinations are the only new representations of y
with respect to H that can be eÆciently constructed from D. In [3], Boneh and
Franklin attempted to show that, if one can construct a new representation from D
which is not a convex combination of vectors in D, then he can compute discrete
log in the group. Although the proof was incorrect, it seems valid to assume the
following:
Conjecture 4.2.5 Given y;H = fh1; h2;    ; h2kg, and D a set of representations
of y with respect to H in Gq, the only new representation that can be constructed
eÆciently (i.e., in polynomial time) are the set of convex combinations of vectors
in D.
The tracing algorithm relies on the assumption that Conjecture 4.2.5 is true.
Suppose a decryption key d (a representation of y with respect to H) is captured
from a pirate decoder built by at most k traitors. If the conjecture is true, then d
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must be a convex combination of a set of at most k encryption keys. But notice
that a user's decryption key is a scalar multiple of a codeword in  . Then d is a
linear combination of at most k codewords in  . Let D   , j D j k. We say d
can be created by D if d can be written as a linear combination of codewords in
D. We require that the intersection of all such D's not empty for any private key
d. All members of the intersections are traced.
Let C be a linear code over Gq of length n, with dimension l 2k, and Hamming
distance 2k+1. Let B be a parity check matrix of C. Then B has dimension 2kn,
and any 2k columns of B are linearly independent. Let   be the set of columns
of B. Now suppose the key d captured is a linear combination of k0  k vectors
in  . Then we can write d = Bw, where w 2 Gn
q
with hamming weight at most
k. Notice that such w is unique, otherwise we have a set of at most 2k linear
dependent columns of B. Thus, d can be expressed as a linear combination of at
most k codewords in   uniquely, given that all coeÆcients are non-zero. Let D
denote the set of such codewords.
Now consider a vector v 2 Gn
q
such that Bv = d. Notice that v can be found
easily. Then B(v   w) = 0. So r = v   w is a codeword in C and w is an error
vector of weight at most k. Since C has dimension 2k+1, it can correct any error of
weight at most k. Therefore w can be found by decoding v to the nearest codeword
in C. Hence, we can nd D and trace back to the users to whom the codewords in
D are assigned. Notice that in all previous tracing schemes, only one of the traitors
are identied. In the BF scheme all traitors whose key was used to construct the
pirate key can be identied.
In [3], BCH codes are used, and O(n log n log log n) group operations are re-
quired in the decoding. In practice, any linear code over Gq of length n, dimension
l 2k, and Hamming distance 2k+1 can be used, as long as the decoding algorithm
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of the code is eÆcient.
Above, we assumed a key has been captured from a pirate decoder. But is it
possible to recover the key based on how the decoder performs on dierent input
ciphertexts?
Single-key Pirates: First, we consider the case in which the pirate decoder has
only one representation d of y and always uses d in decoding. This is called single-
key pirate since only a single decryption key is embedded in the pirate decoder.
We would like to extract this key from the decoder while treating the decoder as a
black box.
Let us consider C = (S; hz11 ;    ; hz2k2k ), where not all of z1; z2;    ; z2k have the
same value. Then C is not a valid ciphertext in the encryption scheme, as the
hi's are raised to dierent powers. The basic idea of tracing is to observe the
decoder's behavior on invalid ciphertexts. The following lemma shows that the
decoder cannot distinguish invalid ciphertexts from valid ciphertexts assuming the







where d = (Æ1; Æ2;    ; Æ2k) is the single key possessed by the decoder, just as it does
on an input of valid ciphertexts.
Lemma 4.2.6 Suppose there is an adversary that can distinguish invalid cipher-
texts in which basis elements are raised to dierent powers, from valid ciphertexts
of the BF encryption scheme in group Gq with a non-negligible probability. Then
the adversary can also solve the DDH problem in Gq, with the same probability.
The reduction is in polynomial time, if k = O(log q).
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Proof: Recall that solving the DDH problem involves: given input (g; ga; gb; x),
decide whether x = gab, where g is a generator of Gq.
Suppose there is an adversary that can distinguish invalid ciphertexts from valid
ciphertexts with a non-negligible probability. First, we construct the public key of
a BF encryption scheme as follows: pick random ri; si 2Zq and set hi = grigasi ; 1 
i  2k; pick random 1; 2;    ; 2k 2Zq and set y = Q2ki=1 hii . The public key is
(y; h1;    ; h2k).























where S is a random element in Gq, and give C to the adversary.
Notice that, if x = gab, then
C = (S; gbr1gabs1 ; gbr2xabs2 ;    ; gbr2kxabs2k)
= (S; (gr1gas1)b ; (gr2gas2)b ;    ; (gr2kgas2k )b)
= (S; hb1; h
b
2;    ; hb2k):
So, C is a valid ciphertext for plaintext S
yb
. And if x 6= gab, C is an invalid ciphertext.
Thus, if the adversary can decide correctly whether C is a valid ciphertext with
a non-negligible probability, then he can certainly decide if x = gab successfully with
the same probability. The reduction is in polynomial time given that k = O(log q).
2
Therefore feeding a pirate decoder an invalid ciphertext,
C = (S; hz11 ;    ; hz2k2k );
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can be easily computed. The tracer's task is to determine
(Æ1; Æ2;    ; Æ2k). Let z1; z2;    ; z2k be 2k linearly independent vectors in Z2kq , and let
zi = (zi;1; zi;2;    ; zi;2k). Then after feeding Ci = (Si; hzi;11 ;    ; hzi;2k2k ); 1  i  2k,












; 1  j  k,
where Aj is the decoder's output for ciphertext Cj. Then h
Æi
i
; 1  i  2k can be
determined from the set of 2k equations. Recall that the data supplier knows the
values of ri such that hi = g
ri; 1  i  2k. Thus the tracer can compute gÆi
i
, for
1  i  2k. Boneh and Franklin suggested to recover Æi from gÆii by using trapdoors
of the discrete log introduced in [11] and [12].
Here we are going to briey describe how Paillier's algorithm in [12] works.
What Paillier presented is a public key cryptosystem that relies on the one-way
function f(x; y) = gxyNmodN2, where x 2ZN , and y 2ZN . Let N = p  q, where
p, q are two large primes. Let g 2ZN2 be an element of order N. The public
key consists of (g), and the private key consists of (g; p; q). To encrypt a message
m < N , Alice chooses a random r < N , and computes c = gmrN , where g is the
public key of Bob. Upon receiving the message c, Bob can retrievem by computing
L(c mod N2)
L(g mod N2)
mod n, where L(u) = u 1
N
, and  is Carmichael's function on N , i,e.
 = lcm(p  1; q   1). The proof of soundness of the encryption scheme is beyond
the scope of this thesis. Here we only describe how the system can be used to
compute discrete logs in BF scheme.
Suppose the BF encryptions are done in Z
N2
, where N is a product of two




L(g mod N2) , since here r = 1, given that the tracer knows the factorization
of N . Thus by employing the trapdoor discrete log scheme in [12], a tracer can
obtain the key in a pirate decoder. Then by using the tracing algorithm in the
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previous section, we can identify all the traitors.
Arbitrary Pirates: Of course, pirates do not have to restrict the decoder to
contain only one single representation of y. Instead, the decoder can contain up
to k representations belonging to the traitors, and then arbitrarily choose a convex
combination of these representations in each decoding session. Boneh and Franklin
did not provide an eÆcient (polynomial time) tracing algorithm for this scenario.
However they did suggest an algorithm called black box conrmation.





CA subsets of users of size k, and test whether
the subset is a superset of the set of traitors. Let d1; d2;    ; dk be the set of keys
belonging to a subset T of size k. To test whether the set of traitors is a subset of
T , the tracer queries the decoder with an invalid ciphertext, C = (S; gz1 ;    ; gz2k ),
such that di  z = w; 1  i  k, where z = (z1;    ; z2k), and w is a random
element in Zq. The pirate decoder would output, A = SQ2k
i=i
(gzi)Æi
. If T is indeed a
superset of traitors, Æ = (Æ1; Æ2;    ; Æ2k) would be a convex combination of a subset
of d1; d2;    ; dk, and Æ  z = w, which implies A = Sgw . Condence in this test can
be increased by making multiple queries, where each query is made independently
using dierent S, z, and w. If for a coalition T , the pirate always outputs A = S
gw
,
then the pirate must possess a subset of keys belonging to T . The intersection of
all such T 's is the set of traitors.
Note this algorithm does not require trapdoors of discrete log. It does not even
require the decoding operation of the linear code mentioned above. But, the black





CA subsets of users of size k, and
clearly it is not a polynomial time algorithm.
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EÆciency Measurement: The data supplier has to store   which is an n2k
matrix of elements in Zq. In addition, he also stores y; r1; r2;    ; r2k; h1; h2;    ; h2k.
Note, the data supplier does not need to store 1; 2;    ; 2k once all the personal
keys are generated. So, the data supplier stores roughly O(nk) elements of Zq.
For encryption, the data supplier computes ya; ha1; h
a
2;    ; ha2k. So there are 2k+1
exponentiations, each requiring O(log q) group multiplications. Thus encryption
requires O(k log q) group multiplications, about O(k log3 q) bit operations. The
size of the enbling block is (2k + 1) log q.
Each user (i.e., his decoder) stores a representation d = (Æ1; Æ2;    ; Æ2k) of y.




)Æi, 1  i  2k, U = Q2k
i=1 ui; U
 1, and nally syaU 1. Each exponentia-
tion requires O(log q) group multiplications. So computing ui; 1  i  2k requires
O(k log q) multiplications. Computing U needs another 2k   1 multiplications. In-
verting U can be done in O(log q) multiplications. Lastly, one more multiplications
is needed to compute s. So the decryption requires O(k log q) group multiplications.
Given a key captured from a pirate decoder, the tracing algorithm can identify
all owners of the representations that are used to construct the pirate key, using
O(n log n log log n) group multiplications. To perform black box tracing on a single
key pirate, the tracer has to make 2k queries to the pirate decoder. This requires
O(k2 log q) multiplications, as each query is equivalent to performing a decryption.
Solving 2k equations to obtain hÆi
i
; 1  i  2k, requires 2k additions in Zq which
is relatively cheap, and up to k exponentiations and k inversions in Gq. So this
step requries O(k log q) multiplications. To obtain gÆi, 1  i  2k, another 2k
exponentiations (O(k log q) multiplications) are needed. Finally to compute Æi,
1  i  2k, using Paillier's algorithm requires 2 exponentiations in Gq and a
constant number of inversions and multiplications in Zq for each Æi. So the nal
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step needs roughly O(k log q) multiplications in Gq. In total, to perform a black
box tracing on a single key pirate decoder, O(k2 log q) multiplications in Gq which
is equivalent to O(k2 log3 q) bit operations are required.
Chapter 5
Attempts of Public Key
Traceability Schemes
The schemes presented in the previous chapter are asymmetric in the sense that
the encryption key and decryption key are dierent. But since the data supplier
knows each user's decryption key, he can still frame any user at his will. There
have been attempts to construct a truly asymmetric key traceability scheme in
which a user's decryption key is kept secret. We will call these schemes public
key traceability schemes. In this chapter we present the attempts by Ptzmann
[13], and Kurosawa and Desmedt [10]. Then we derive a public scheme from the
Boneh-Franklin traceability scheme discussed in Section 4.2.
5.1 Ptzmann's Schemes
In [13], Ptzmann proposed three asymmetric schemes in which the data supplier
and users do not share any secrets. In this model there is an entity called judge to
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whom evidence should be submitted in order to prove the accused user is indeed
a traitor. The rst scheme employs a public key cryptosystem to encrypt/decrypt
session keys. The scheme itself is very simple. However, the enabling block size of
the scheme is linear in terms of the number of users, which is very ineÆcient. The
remaining two schemes require an underlying symmetric traitor tracing scheme.
The basic idea is to have a trusted third party (TTP) to assign the personal keys so
that the data supplier does not know who gets which personal key. Unfortunately
all these schemes are awed.
Scheme A: with linear-sized enabling blocks. In this scheme, each user has





, for signature generation/verication. Let E, D be the encryption and
decryption function of the system respectively. So to encrypt a message m for user
i, one computes c = Eei(m), and user i computes Ddi(c) to retrieve m. Suppose E
and D are also used for signature verication and generation as well, eg. as with
RSA. Thus, to sign a message m, user i computes sigi = Dd0i(H(m)), to verify the
signature, one computes Ee0
i
(sigi) and compare it with H(m), where H is a suitable
cryptographic has function such as SHA-1.




sigi = Dd0i(H(di)) on his decryption key di, using signing key d
0
i
. The data supplier
encrypts a session key s using keys ei, 1  i  n. This leads to an enabling block
Be = kni=1Eei(s) of size O(n). Each user can decrypt s by using his private key di,
s = Ddi(Eei(s)).
Suppose a pirate decoder is captured. Ptzmann assumed that the decoder's
decryption key can be obtained, and no black box tracing was provided. The data
supplier nds u such that sigu is a valid signature of d, by comparing H(d) with
Ee0i
(sigi), 1  i  n. He can then submit d, e0u, sigu to a judge as the proof that u is
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a traitor. Since the data supplier does not know the private encryption key of any
user, it is unlikely that he can nd a key d which has the same signature as a user's
private key signed by the user's signing key. However a user can easily submit a false
signature of his private encryption key, so that the data supplier would not nd a
match between d and the message produced by verifying the signature submitted by
the user. The data supplier has no way to verify the signature without knowledge
of the user's private encryption key.
However, the data supplier can perform the tracing in a similar way as in the
CFNP schemes. For each i, 1  i  n, replace Eej (s), j 6= i in the enabling block
by some random data. If the decoder can still decode then it must have key di, and
user i is a traitor. With this modication we don't even require each user to have
a pair of keys for signature generation/verication. But, notice that if the decoder
has more than one key, it can detect tracing by decrypting s using two or more keys.
So strictly speaking, the scheme can trace a traitor coalition only of size 1. But if
we assume the detection is infeasible, maybe due to the limitation of a decoder's
computing power, the scheme can trace a coaltion of any size. Nevertheless the
enabling block size makes the scheme very ineÆcient. And there is no elegant proof
that can be submitted to the judge, expect for performing the tracing in front of
him.
Scheme B: Transform a symmetric scheme to a public-key scheme:
This scheme is obtained from a symmetric scheme by using a cryptographic primi-
tive called a secure 2-party protocol. Such a protocol achieves the following goals:
two parties have secret input x1, x2 respectively. Both of them want to know g(x1,
x2), where g is a function known to both of them. However, party one should not
gain any information on x2, nor party 2 on x1, except for what is revealed by the
value of g(x1; x2).
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Suppose we have a symmetric tracing scheme. Let P = fP1; P2;    ; Png denote
the set of personal keys. Instead of assigning Pi to user i, we want to assign the
keys in a way such that the data supplier does not know the identity of the owner
of any specic personal key.
User i is going to secretly select an id, idi (all users should have distinct ids).
Then user i inputs his secret idi to the 2-party protocol we call PP. The data
supplier inputs the set of personal keys to PP. The protocol returns a personal key
Pidi to user i and uses a known one way hash function f to compute hi = f(idi)
which is returned to the data supplier who will keep a list of hi's.
To trace a traitor, the tracing algorithm of the symmetric scheme was rst run.
The algorithm does not trace an actual traitor, but identies a personal key, say Pt
which belongs to a traitor. The data supplier then compares f(t) with hi, 1  i  n.
If f(t) = hc, c is a traitor.
We notice that this scheme can be broken by the data supplier who can easily
compute f(i), 1  i  n. Then he does a simple comparison between f(i)'s and
hi's to nd out who is the actual owner of each personal key. Thus this scheme does
not provide any more protection on users from being framed by the data supplier
than the underlying symmetric tracing scheme. The third scheme is very similar
to this scheme, and hence suers the same problem.
5.2 Kurosawa and Desmedt's Scheme
Kurosawa and Desmedt suggested a public key tracing scheme in [10]. This scheme
was derived from the asymmetric scheme discussed in section 4.1. Although the
asymmetric scheme has been broken, here we are more interested in the way the
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authors transform a non-public scheme to a public scheme.
In the new scheme, there are c entities called agents: A1, A2,   , Ac. Each
agent Aj generates a random polynomial
fj(x) = aj;0 + aj;1x+ aj;2x
2 +    + aj;kxk
aj;0, aj;1,   , aj;k 2Zq. Let f(x) = Pcj=1 fj(x). Each agent Aj also computes
fj(i), 1  i  n, and distributes fj(i)'s to user i through a secure channel. User
i computes f(i) =
P
c
j=1 fj(i) and uses it as his private key. The data supplier
receives yj;i = g




j=1 yj;i. The public key is (y0; y1;    ; yk). Encryption and decryption works
in the same way as in the non-public scheme discussed in section 4.1.
Notice that in the non-public scheme, the data supplier is the one who generates
f(x) and computes each user's private key. But, here the c agents act together as
the key generator/distributor of the scheme.
We know that a coalition of more than one traitor can build a decoder without
being traced. But, here we are only concerned with whether the data supplier can
obtain any user's private key from the values yj;i, 1  i  c, 1  j  k. It can be
easily shown that if the data supplier can obtain f(i) for any i 2 f1; 2;    ; ng, then
he can compute discrete logs in the group S =< g >. Thus the data supplier can
not frame any user, if the discrete log problem is hard in S. Furthermore, unless
all c agents collude, or at least k + 1 users collaborate, f(x) cannot be computed.
Thus the transformation works in the sense that it does prevent the data supplier
from framing users.
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5.3 Boneh-Franklin public scheme
Let us consider what features the schemes in the previous two sections have in
common. Notice that in both cases, there is a TTP which does key distribution
or/and generation, which was done by the data supplier in the non-public schemes.
In Ptzmann's scheme, the 2-party protocol serves as the TTP, and in Kurosawa-
Desmedt's public scheme, the c agents act together as a TTP. In all the non-public
schemes presented, the data supplier does both key generation and distribution. In
order to convert a non-public scheme to a public scheme, we need to relieve the data
supplier from both duties. In Ptzmann's scheme, although the 2-party protocol
performs the key distribution, the data supplier still generates all personal keys,
which leads to an easy attack on the scheme.
Here we present a method to derive a public scheme from Boneh-Franklin's
scheme which was discussed in Section 4.2. We assume the scheme does not have
the trapdoor which makes it easy to compute discrete logs in the underlying group
Gq.
Recall that in the BF scheme, the data supplier randomly chooses 1, 2,   ,
2k 2Zq and computes y = Q2ki=1 hii . In the new scheme this step is performed by
a TTP. The TTP also has the generator of Gq: g, and the values of ri, 1  i  2k,
such that hi = g
ri. These values enable the TTP to compute each user's private
key as the data supplier does in the original BF scheme.
In the new scheme, the data supplier does not know any representation of y.
In order to frame a user, the data supplier rst has to construct a decoder which
has a representation of y as its decryption key. It is easy to show that if the data
supplier can construct a representation of y with respect to h1, h2,   , h2k from y
and h1, h2,   , h2k alone, then he can solve discrete logs in Gq. We require a BF
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scheme without the trapdoor so the data supplier can not frame any user.
As in Kurosawa-Desmedt's public scheme, we can have several agents to act
together as a TTP, so that a user can be framed only if all agents collaborate. Each









yj is made public and i;j is given to user i through a secure channel.

































































CHAPTER 5. ATTEMPTS OF PUBLIC KEY TRACEABILITY SCHEMES107




2 ;    ; Æ(i)2k ) is a presentation of y with respect to basis:
(h1; h2;    ; h2k). Encryption and decryption works in the same way as in the orig-
inal BF scheme.
All c agents have to collaborate in order to obtain any representation of y. So,
we have derived a public scheme from a non-public BF scheme. Since we assume the
BF scheme has no trapdoors to help computing discrete log in Gq, the new scheme
does not support black box tracing. But given a key found in a pirate decoder, the
same tracing algorithm in original BF scheme can be used to trace all the traitors
whose private key is used in constructing the key captured in the pirate decoder.
Chapter 6
Other Traceability Schemes
In this chapter, we present a couple of other traceability schemes that have been
suggested. Chameleon is a stream cipher designed by Anderson and Manifavas [2]
to allow traitor tracing. Digital signet was proposed by Dwork, Lotspiech and Noar
[7], whose goal was to motivate users to be self-policing.
6.1 Chameleon
In 1996, Ross Anderson and Charalamps Manifavas introduced a stream cipher
called Chameleon which allows traitor tracing. The main idea is to give each user
a slightly dierent decryption key that had the eect of producing slightly dierent
plaintexts.
The scheme is built upon a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG), or any
block cipher in output feedback mode. A ngerprinting scheme is required. Finger-
printing involves uniquely marking and registering each copy of a piece of data so
that, given a copy of the data, the distributor is able to trace it back to its owner.
108
CHAPTER 6. OTHER TRACEABILITY SCHEMES 109
A mark is a position which can be in one of q states in the data. A ngerprint
is a collection of marks, and can be thought as a codeword of length L over an
alphabet of size q, L is the number of marks in the data. An (N;L) ngerprinting
scheme is a set of N ngerprints of length L. However a coalition of users may
detect some of the marks, namely the ones in which their copies dier. They can
then change these marks arbitrarily hoping to mask their identities. We call an
(N;L) ngerprinting scheme is totally k-secure if there exists a tracing algorithm A
satisfying the following condition: if a coalition T of size at most k generates a copy
x by changing the marks where their copies dier then A(x) 2 T . If we want to
make Chameleon a (k; n) traitor tracing scheme, we would require a totally k-secure
ngerprinting scheme which can produce n copies of data. For a detailed discussion
of ngerprinting schemes, see [4]. In [2], the authors randomly generated 4000
marks in a piece of data of size 512KB, to achieve a (4; n) traitor tracing scheme.
In Chameleon, instead of planting ngerprints into the content, each user's per-
sonal key is embedded with a unique ngerprint so that when a decoder decrypts the
ciphertext, the ngerprint would be generated in the output. Notice that here only
one copy of the ciphertext is broadcasted, while an ordinary ngerprinting scheme
would require several slightly dierent ciphertexts and each of them is distributed
to an unique user.
Key Generation/Distribution: Each user should have two keys: The rst
key, which we call A, is the same for all users. A is used as a seed for the PRNG,
and can be broadcasted publicly. Each user i also gets Bi which is a table of l
r-bit words - a total of lr bits of data. In the example in [2] Bi is a table of 2
16
64-bit words - i.e., 512 KB of data. Each Bi is obtained by introducing a unique
ngerprint to the master key B of the same size owned by the data supplier. Bi is
never changed after it is assigned.
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Encryption/Decryption: To encrypt a r-bit content, the data supplier takes
the next log l (assume l is a power of 2) bits of output of the PRNG and uses it to
select one word of B. How the word is selected is public information. The selected
word is then XORed with the content to produce a ciphertext. In the same way,
the ciphertext can be decrypted. But each user uses his personal Bi instead of B
in decryption. Notice that any marking in the chosen word of Bi is inherited by
the output.
Tracing: The tracing relies on the tracing algorithm of the underlying n-
gerprinting scheme. Suppose a coalition T of at most k traitors collaborated and
built a pirate decoder. The B key in the pirate decoder is generated by changing
the marks at which the coalition members' B keys dier. Since the B keys are
produced by a totally k-secure ngerprinting scheme, the tracing algorithm of the
scheme is able to trace one member of the T given the marks in the B key of the
pirate decoder. Suppose a pirate decoder was captured. The data supplier can use
the decoder to produce a content embedded with the ngerprint in the decoder's
B key. The tracing algorithm of the ngerprinting scheme should be able to trace
one member of the coalition.
In the example used in [2], 4000 marks are generated at random in each user's
B key. It is expected that the example scheme can trace a traitor if there are at
most four traitors.
In general, the security level of the tracing scheme relies on the underlying
ngerprinting scheme. Besides the ngerprinting scheme, the rest of Chameleon is
very simple, as only a PRNG is needed. It does not even require an encryption
scheme to encrypt the content, as content is XORed with the words chosen from
the B key. The scheme also supports a straightforward black box tracing algorithm
as long as the tracing algorithm of the ngerprinting scheme is available.
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Unfortunately, in [4], it was shown that, for c  2 and n  3, there are no
totally c-secure (n; l) ngerprinting schemes. This forces us to settle for schemes
which trace a traitor with a small error probability . Such schemes are called
k-secure schemes with -error. The following two theorems were proved in [4].
Theorem 6.1.1 For n  3 and  > 0, there exists an (n; 2n2 log(2n=) ngerprint-
ing scheme which is n-secure with -error.
Theorem 6.1.2 For n  3 and  > 0, there exists an (n; k4 log(n=) log(1=))
ngerprinting scheme which is k-secure with -error.
Notice that the length of the ngerprinting scheme in Theorem 6.2 is roughly
the same as the size of the base keys in the one level open CFNP traceability
schemes. Thus Chameleon schemes require very large personal keys. On the other
hand, Chameleon does not require an enabling block as long as the data supplier
and users agree on the A key which can be broadcasted to each user. As well, the
speed of Chameleon is very fast.
6.2 Digital Signet
In 1996, digital signet was proposed by Dwork, Lotspiech and Naor [7]. In this
scheme, each session key is encrypted using each user's personal key, which includes
some sensitive private information (such as credit card number) related to the
owner. The scheme tried to force the owner either to reveal the sensitive information
or to redistribute the session key which is as long as the content, i.e., redistributing
it would require the same bandwidth as the content distribution channel.
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Each user i must submit sensitive information ui to the data supplier so that
the DS can compute a signet i for user i using a authentication funtion. Using ui
and i user i is able to obtain session key s using a public extrication function h,
s = h(ui; i). s is required to be much longer in length than ui and i.
The authors require f to be incompressible. A function h(t) is incompressible
if kh(x)k >> kxk for all x and in order for A to communicate h(x) to B in o(kxk)
bits, A must reveal x. In order words, there is no feasible computable short message
that allows B to learn h(x) while simultaneously protecting x.
The incompressible function chosen by the authors is very similar to the en-
cryption/ decryption function used in Kurosawa and Desmedt's (KD) traceability
scheme in Section 4.1. Let G be a group of order p, let q be a prime such that
q j p   1. Let g be an element of order q in G.
As in KD scheme, the data supplier chooses a random function:
h(x) = a  (b1x+ b2x2 +   + bkxk):
and Z = (g; y1 = g
b1; y2 = g
b2 ;    ; yk = gbk) is made public. ga comprises one block
of session key. The authentication function takes ui and computes i = f(ui),
where ui is the personal information submitted by user i. Then i is returned to
user i as his signet.























The full session key is obtained by choosing g1, g2,   , and concatenating ga1 ,
g
a
2 ,   . So
Zj = (gj; y1;j = g
b1
j ; y2;j = g
b2
j ;    ; yk;j = gbkj ); j = 1; 2;   
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are also required to be made public. This scheme seems highly ineÆcient: to
encrypt one block of session key ga
i
, the amount of data needed to be made public
has size (k+1)kga
i
k. However in this scheme, the authors attempted to prevent the
traitors from redistributing the session keys, while this problem was not addressed
in any previously discussed schemes.
Clearly, the attack on SD scheme can be also employed to attack the signet




,   , uk
i
, i 2 T . The published information would allow the decoding of the
session keys, but protect the ui's from being exposed. In an attempt to reduce the
computation cost and thwart the attack, the authors proposed a modication of
the above scheme.
Let m = 2k, choose random B = fb1; b2;    ; bmg, and make
Z = (g; y1 = g
b1 ; y2 = g
b2;    ; ym = gbm)
public. Let P : U ! f1; 2;    ;mgs, be a random function. Suppose P (i) =
(c1; c2;    ; cs), then user i's signet i = a  (Psj=1 bcjuji ), i.e. i = fi(ui), where












where P (i)r denotes the rth entry of P (i). i together with P (i) are distributed







cj . A full session key is obtained by
concatenating ga1 ; g
a
2 ;    as in the original scheme. This modied scheme reduces
the amount of computation during the generation of the signets and session keys,
but increases the amount of public information required.
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The above modication does not prevent the attack outlined in Section 4.1.
WLOG, let f1; 2;    tg be a coalition of traitors. The coalition computes a convex
combination of fi(ui), 1  i  t: v0 = Pti cifi(ui), where Pti ci = 1. And for each





































































The authors claimed that there is a high probability that for a random set of
k traitors, there exist a bj such that bj is only assigned to exactly one traitor say
t. So ut can be found easily giving vj. Let us consider this probability. There
are k traitors, each assigned s elements from the set B = fb1; b2;    ; bmg with
replacement. So there are a total of msk ways to do the assignment. WLOG,
say the rst number assigned to traitor t is bj which is not assigned to any other
traitor. There are m ways to choose bj, and there are m
(s 1) ways to assign s   1
more numbers to t, as bj can be assigned to t more than once. For the rest of the
k   1 users there are m   1 elements available, and hence there are (m   1)s(k 1)
possible assignments. Thus the probability that one traitor is assigned a bj which




























pr is less than 1
4
if we take s = 3 and m = 2(k   1). And it is less than 3
4
if we
take s = 3 and m = 10(k   1). Furthermore this is the probability for a randomly
chosen coalition. The probability that there is a coalition of size k which does not
have such property would be extremely high.






. But without the knowledge of at, it is impossible to nd ut. And
vj could even be a linear combination of the powers of some other ui's. Thus we
believe the attack still works against this modied version of the signet scheme.
Signet is quite similar to the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme, except that signet
attempted to address the problem of a pirate redistributing session keys. Conse-
quently, the public information required is O(k) times the actual content to be
broadcasted. This seems very impractical.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
We have surveyed several traceability schemes in the previous chapters. We at-
tempted to categorize them into three types: symmetric, asymmetric and public,
based on how the session keys are encrypted and decrypted.
CFNP and SW schemes are symmetric schemes in the sense that the session
keys are encrypted using symmetric encryption schemes: the keys used to encrypt
and decrypt each share are the same. The existence of six types of CFNP were
proven, while actual constructions for the open one level scheme were also given.
The constructions arose from combinatorial objects such as transversal designs and
orthogonal arrays.
Stinson-Wei's scheme is similar to the one level open CFNP scheme. The au-
thors provided constructions that are as eÆcient as the constructions for the CFNP
scheme. Stinson-Wei's constructions are based on combinatorial objects such as
balanced incomplete block designs.
Given the set of keys in a pirate decoder, a straightforward algorithm is available
to identify at least one traitor. Although black box tracing algorithms were also
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provided, they were much more complicated, and even worse, they can be detected
by a private decoder having extra keys. The importance of the requirement of a
black box tracing algorithm might be overstated. If the traitors can access their
decoders to nd out their personal keys, it seems reasonable to assume that the
data supplier would be also able to access the pirate decoder to determine the key
without a black box algorithm. It does not make sense if the pirate decoder would
provide more tamper resistance than a legitimate decoder, and hence cost more
money to make.
The amount of base keys the data supplier has to store is in the order of
O(k4 log n) (using a one level open scheme). The same amount of decryptions
have to be performed to decrypt a session key. Each user has to store O(k2 log n)
keys and perform the same amount of decryptions to obtain a session key.
The Kurosawa-Desmedt and Boneh-Franklin schemes are asymmetric schemes.
The keys used to encrypt and decrypt a session key are dierent. In fact, the
encryption scheme alone is a valid public key encryption scheme. But, due to the
requirement of tracing, each user's private key is known to the data supplier. Thus
the DS can impersonate any user at his will.
The security of encryption schemes in the both of these schemes rely on the dis-
crete logarithm problem. The tracing algorithm in the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme
was broken. The authors made an unrealistic assumption that all pirate decoder's
decryption keys must be of the same form as the legitimate decoders.
The Boneh-Franklin scheme also requires an assumption on the structure of
the key in all pirate decoders. The soundness of the tracing algorithm relies on
Conjecture 4.2.5. If the conjecture holds, then given a key captured from a pirate
decoder, the Boneh-Franklin scheme employs coding theory techniques to trace all
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traitors who helped in constructing the key. A black box tracing algorithm was
provided to trace the traitors in a single key pirate only if trapdoors can be planted
to help the data supplier computing discrete logarithms in the underlying group.
No eÆcient black box tracing algorithm is available for arbitrary pirates.
The biggest advantage of Boneh-Franklin scheme is that it can trace all traitors
who contributed in building the key in a pirate decoder. In the CFNP scheme,
only one of the traitors is identied. In the Boneh-Franklin scheme, each user's
personal key has size O(k log q) bits, and the same amount of group multiplications
are required in decryption. q is usually very large: e.g., in the order of 280, which
is much larger than n. The amount of information each user has to store in the
one level open CFNP scheme is slightly more then what a user has to store the
Boneh-Franklin scheme. The data supplier has to store O(nk log q) bits of data in
the Boneh-Franklin scheme while in the CFNP scheme O(k4 log n) keys are stored.
Assuming each key is roughly log q bits in size, and k is much smaller than n, CFNP
scheme has an advantage in the amount of information has to be stored by the data
supplier.
There are a couple of attempts to construct public traceability schemes which
require the data supplier and users share no secrets at all. One successful attempt is
to build upon an asymmetric scheme (such as Boneh-Franklin scheme) and having
a trusted third party to handle the key generation and distribution, so that the
data supplier has no knowledge on the user's personal keys. One open problem is
to construct a public traceability scheme without the requirement of a trusted third
party.
Chameleon is a stream cipher designed to support traitor tracing. It is a very
attractive scheme since its encryption/decryption is extremely fast. The encryp-
tion/ decryption process involves a PRNG and XOR operations only. However
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Chameleon uses ngerprinting schemes which require each user's personal key to
be extremely large: as large as the size of all base keys in a one level open CFNP
scheme.
Digital signet employed the same encryption function as the Kurosawa-Desmedt
scheme. Hence it is vulnerable to the same attack which broke the Kurosawa-
Desmedt scheme. The digital signet scheme attempted to address the problem of
session key redistribution by a pirate. But, in doing so, the amount of information
that has to be made public is O(k) times as long as the actual content to be
broadcasted. This makes digital signet highly impractical.
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